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PATENTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT* 
DAN L. BURK† 
ABSTRACT 
Patents are intended as a means of promoting innovation through private 
pecuniary incentives. But the patent system has for some time been on a 
collision course with guarantees of expressive freedom. Surprisingly, no 
one has ever subjected patent doctrine to a close First Amendment analysis. 
In this paper I show, first, that patents clearly affect expressive freedom; 
second, that patents are subject to legal scrutiny for their effect on 
expressive rights; and third, that patents are not excused from scrutiny by 
virtue of constituting property rights or by virtue of private discretion. After 
examining the patent system in terms of familiar First Amendment metrics 
such as strict scrutiny, narrow tailoring, governmental interest, and least 
restrictive means, I conclude that even though many patents may survive 
First Amendment analysis, many will not. 
Patents, which function as government-sanctioned monopolies, 
invade core First Amendment rights when they are allowed to 
obstruct the essential channels of scientific, economic, and political 
discourse.‡  
                                                 
* Copyright 2017–18 by Dan L. Burk. 
† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. My thanks to Zackory Burns, 
Alex Camacho, Seth Davis, Stephen Lee, Leah Litman, Jonathan Glater, and Ted Sichelman; to Elvin 
Lee and the participants in the Stanford Law School/Mozilla April 17, 2017 forum Should Patent Law 
Be a First Amendment Issue?; and to participants in the October 11, 2017 Oxford Internet Institute 
Departmental Seminar for helpful discussion in the formulation of this article. 
‡ Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., 
concurring). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patents are temporary grants of exclusive rights, authorized by Congress 
and issued by a federal agency, intended as a means of promoting 
innovation through private pecuniary incentives.1 Unlike the parallel system 
of copyright, which is expressly intended to cover expressive works, the 
patent system is supposedly directed toward the functional, technical arts.2 
Consequently, there has historically been little worry that the grant of patent 
exclusivity might conflict with the constitutional protection of speech and 
the press governed by the First Amendment.3 
But the patent system has for some time been on a collision course with 
guarantees of expressive freedom. Some eighteen years ago I first identified 
a set of First Amendment difficulties posed by the patent system.4 Patenting 
of the “liberal arts”5 had brought technical function into an alarming degree 
of contact with protected expression. These issues became manifest in large 
measure due to the growing practice of software patenting, combined with 
an increasingly expansive approach to patent eligible subject matter.6 But 
some version of these manifest quandaries had lain latent within the patent 
system since its inception, and the rise of software patents had merely made 
clear that patent law lacked the kind of doctrinal exceptions that had avoided 
a First Amendment collision in the related law of copyright.7 
                                                 
1. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); see also Dan L. Burk, The 
Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
397 (2012) (discussing incentive justifications for the patent system). 
2. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1879). In contrast to patent law, germinal work 
on copyright and the First Amendment was begun nearly a half century ago. See Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does 
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 
(1970); see also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the 
Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979) (discussing the First Amendment in the context 
of the 1976 Copyright Act). During the ensuing decades, the literature on the topic has become quite 
large. For a very small sample, see, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech 
Law: What Copyright has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and 
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C.L. REV. 1 (2001); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on 
Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 910 (2002); Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking 
Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (2010). 
3. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).  
4. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000). 
5. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.L. REV. 1139, 1164 
(1999) (contrasting the eighteenth century “useful arts” with the “liberal arts” such as grammar, logic, 
mathematics, and rhetoric). 
6. Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855 
(2007); John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569, 588–90 (2002). 
7. See Burk, supra note 4, at 150–60; see also Ralph D. Clifford & Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The 
Constitutionality of Design Patents, 14 CHI. KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 553 (2015) (arguing for a fair use 
standard in design, rather than utility, patents); Mark Lemley & Julie Cohen, Patent Scope and 
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Since I addressed the question nearly twenty years ago, little has been 
said on the topic,8 despite a long twilight struggle by the Supreme Court9 
and many commentators10 to define the proper limits of patentable subject 
matter.11 The problem has been raised by amici in key cases addressing the 
scope of patentable subject matter, with little judicial response.12 But the 
discussion has been re-invigorated by the concurrence added by Judge 
Haldane Mayer of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
to the recent decision in Intellectual Ventures I v. Symantec.13 Judge Mayer 
opined that software is a form of speech, that software patents serve to 
frustrate protected expression, and that proper adherence to the Supreme 
Court’s patentable subject matter test from Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l14 
would serve First Amendment interests by purging the patent system of 
objectionable software patents, and perhaps all software patents. 
                                                 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29–37 (2001) (discussing patent limitations and 
exceptions that might accommodate software reverse engineering); Maureen O’Rourke, Toward a 
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing for recognition of fair 
use within the patent system). 
8. Lange and Powell have briefly suggested that First Amendment jurisprudence that is broad 
enough to constrain copyrights might also capture some expressive patents. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. 
JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 179, 308 (2009). For an unusual policy discussion on patents and speech, see Ali Feroz, 
Technical Speech: Patents, Expert Knowledge, and the First Amendment, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
277 (2016) (arguing that both the Patent Clause and the First Amendment promote technical knowledge). 
Additionally, contemporaneous with the completion of this paper, Professor Chiang has posted a draft 
paper that agrees with some of my broad conclusions, while differing in analytical approach. See Tun-
Jen Chiang, Patents and Free Speech, 107 GEO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3114931 [https://perma.cc/6RC8-R9 W7]. 
9. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Lab., 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
10. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of 
Abstractions, 16 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 647 (2015); Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court 
in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (2014); Kevin Emerson Collins, Prometheus 
Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 391 (2012); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563 (2012); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life 
After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011). 
11. For comparative overviews, see Dan L. Burk, Patent Law’s Problem Children: Software and 
Biotechnology in Transatlantic Context, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW 187 (Ruth Okediji 
& Margo Bagley eds., 2014); Dan L. Burk, The Inventive Concept in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 4 
IIC 865, 866 (2014). 
12. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298); Brief of the 
American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Mayo Collaborative Serv. 
v. Prometheus Lab. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150); Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute, 
Reason Foundation, & Competitive Enterprise Institute in Support of Petitioners, Mayo Collaborative 
Serv. v. Prometheus Lab. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150); Brief for Amicus Curiae American 
Civil Liberties Union for Affirmance in Support of Appellee, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(No. 2007-1130). 
13. 838 F.3d 1307, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
14. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Reactions to Judge Mayer’s analysis were sharp, vehement, and in some 
cases intemperate.15 A common reaction has been to claim that Mayer 
misunderstands or misreads the Supreme Court’s Alice decision; these 
reactions tend to adopt a fairly literalist reading of Alice, noting that it 
nowhere explicitly excludes software from patentable subject matter, while 
cabining any broader implications of the decision.16 The most intemperate 
and least sensible responses, worded rather as if Mayer had in some fashion 
betrayed some fundamental principle of human decency, have asserted that 
Mayer’s comments reveal him to be unfit for office, and call for him to 
resign or recuse himself from software cases.17 Such comments to some 
extent reflect unhappiness among the practicing bar with Mayer’s broad, 
and arguably overbroad, understanding of the implications of the Alice 
subject matter test. But the reaction also includes attitudes ranging from 
skeptical to incredulous that patent law could have any serious association 
with expressive rights or the First Amendment.18 
A great deal has already been written and will, alas, likely continue to be 
written about the software subject matter questions implicated in Judge 
Mayer’s concurrence.19 Such questions are not the focus of this paper. Here 
I will instead concentrate on a series of questions or objections raised by his 
observations on patents and the First Amendment. Rather than recapitulate 
arguments made in my previous work, I will focus on questions raised by 
the responses to Judge Mayer. These range from questions that are fairly 
general to questions that are subject matter specific: Can technology be 
subjected to the jurisprudence of free speech? Is the patent system 
constitutionally immune from First Amendment scrutiny? Aren’t patents 
content neutral? Are property or other exclusive rights immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny? Is there any state action in the enforcement of a 
                                                 
15. See, e.g., Michael Borella & George Lyons III, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec 
Corp. – Judge Mayer on the First Amendment, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 24, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www. 
patentdocs.org/2016/10/intellectual-ventures-i-llc-v-symantec-corp-judge-mayer-on-the-first-
amendment-.html [https://perma. cc/DLJ5-HBAH]; Stuart P. Meyer, Judge Mayers’s Concurrence in IV 
Shows the Problem with Judicially Created Exceptions, BILSKIBLOG (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.bilski 
blog.com/blog/2016/10/judge-mayers-concurrence-in-iv-shows-the-problem-with-judicially-created-
exceptions.html [https://perma.cc/KSV5-GD44]; Eugene Quinn, It Is Time for Judge Mayer to Step 
Down from the Federal Circuit, IPWATCH (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/ 
10/06/judge-mayer-step-down-federal-circuit/id=73567 [https://perma.cc/TQV2-MTRY]. But see also 
Mike Masnick, Prominent Pro-patent Judge Issues Opinion Declaring All Software Patents Bad, 
TECHDIRT, (Oct. 6, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20161005/15280135720/prom 
inent-pro-patent-judge-issues-opinion-declaring-all-software-patents-bad.shtml [https://perma.cc/X9F 
G-YLCH] (technologist blog applaud-ing Mayer’s concurrence). 
16. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 15; Quinn, supra note 15. 
17. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 15.  
18. Although Judge Mayer’s concurrence should hardly come as a surprise, given that he raised 
some of the same First Amendment concerns in his dissent from the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion 
in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
19. See, e.g., supra note 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
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patent? What might be the proper level of constitutional scrutiny for a 
patent? 
Both Judge Mayer’s concurrence and the vehement responses 
demonstrate that there is much at stake in answering these questions: taking 
the First Amendment implications of patent law seriously could throw into 
doubt the constitutional permissibility of thousands of existing patents. 
Despite these radical implications of addressing my series of First 
Amendment questions, my doctrinal goals here are relatively moderate. I 
show, first, that patents clearly affect expressive freedom, and may 
compromise interests that are protected under the First Amendment. 
Problematic patents certainly include software patents, but many other 
patents are implicated as well. Second, I will show that patents are subject 
to legal scrutiny for their effect on expressive rights, and, third, that patents 
are not excused from scrutiny by virtue of constituting property rights or by 
virtue of private discretion. I survey well-established First Amendment 
doctrines and standards of review to offer some thoughts on the proper type 
and level of scrutiny for different types of patents. Having mapped the 
terrain, I conclude with some observations and challenges for future 
research. 
I. PATENTS AND PROTECTED EXPRESSION 
The potential for First Amendment conflict with the exclusive rights 
conveyed by patents should be immediately apparent. The First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”20 Clearly the patent statute is a law, enacted by 
Congress, and in a number of instances it abridges freedom of speech, and 
perhaps freedom of the press. Of course, the plain text of the amendment 
has never been read to mean exactly what it says; Congress makes a plethora 
of laws regarding communication and expression that have been upheld as 
permissible under the First Amendment: true threats against the president 
are prohibited;21 information about nuclear weapons is classified and 
restricted;22 advice promoting tax evasion is outlawed.23 But when Congress 
                                                 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2017). 
22. See Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2274 (2000) (prohibiting revelation of certain 
information concerning nuclear weapons); cf. Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181, 186 (2000) 
(prohibiting disclosure of inventions subject to secrecy orders when “detrimental to national security.”). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215, 216–17 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding criminal 
punishment for disseminating information on tax evasion); United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1978) (same). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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does make such laws, the First Amendment is implicated and constitutional 
scrutiny ensues. 
Patent law should be no different, but this perhaps requires some 
illustration. It is relatively simple to identify issued patents that involve 
speech or communication, and that are potentially problematic from a First 
Amendment standpoint. The exercise of identifying such patents is valuable 
not only in establishing the legitimacy of First Amendment analysis for 
patenting, but in delineating the contours of such analysis. Clearly not all 
patent grants implicate expressive freedom, and those that do so will 
implicate free speech to different extents. Some patents will be entirely 
permissible when put through the proper First Amendment tests; others may 
be impermissible; others will be either permissible or impermissible under 
different circumstances or for different reasons. 
A. Problematic Patents 
We begin with what is clearly a core First Amendment technology. Some 
of the reactions to Judge Mayer’s concurrence point out, entirely correctly, 
that if the First Amendment is implicated by patenting, then exclusive rights 
in inventions such as a printing press would potentially be problematic.24 
The core observation itself seems correct and rather straightforward; 
printing presses are machines, which fall within the statutory patentable 
subject matter categories of machines, processes, compositions of matter, 
and articles of manufacture.25 If a given printing press is novel and non-
obvious over previous printing presses, it could be the subject of a patent.  
The point of those offering this observation seems to be an 
accompanying implication that, since printing presses are of course patent 
eligible, and are not problematic, patents cannot implicate freedom of 
speech. But both the premises and the logic of this argument are faulty. 
Quite to the contrary, rather than dispelling the First Amendment issue, this 
observation underscores the dimensions of the First Amendment problem. 
Take for example the device displayed in Figure 1, one of the drawings from 
U.S. patent number 5,199, issued for an improved type of printing press in 
1847. The claimed invention was at the time of issue judged to be a new, 
non-obvious, and useful device, eligible for a patent. But it is also a 
mechanism or conduit for communicative speech.  
Recall that the First Amendment restricts Congress from making laws 
restricting freedom of speech or of the press.26 As Edward Lee has pointed 
out in another context, the guarantee of freedom of “the press,” separate 
                                                 
24. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 15. 
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
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from that of “speech” is directed to regulations on the physical apparatus of 
communication—originally the printing press—and not necessarily to 
regulations restricting the work of journalists as “the press.”27 The Supreme 
Court has since made clear that this constitutional provision extends to other 
more modern apparatus for communication, such as radio, television, and 
motion picture devices.28 Thus, government conferral of exclusive rights in 
such printing presses unquestionably raises First Amendment issues.  
                                                 
27. Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, in FIRST AMENDMENT LAW HANDBOOK 2008–2009 
(2009) 
28. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Figure 1. 
 
It should be fairly obvious that, were the government to assign control of 
all printing presses to a single owner, the First Amendment would be 
implicated and constitutional scrutiny would be triggered. Indeed, Justice 
Scalia has rather pointedly highlighted the “core abuse” against which the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
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First Amendment was directed was the system of printing press licensing 
imposed by the British monarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
to curtail the “evils” of the device.29 The British Crown’s related system of 
censorship by conveying exclusivity into private hands—those of the 
Stationer’s Guild—led to limitation via the Statute of Anne, the predecessor 
to modern copyright law.30 The Guild was also granted a “publication 
patent” in addition to its copyright privileges,31 which was not quite the 
instrument we would denominate a patent today.32 But assigning 
governmental printing monopolies by means of a patent would be no less a 
licensing and censorship system than those historical abuses. 
When we come to U.S. patent 5,199 and similar grants covering 
publication machinery, of course the government assignment of a patent 
does not transfer ownership of all printing presses—only some of them, 
specifically, those that fall within the scope of the patent claims. Patent 
law’s novelty and non-obviousness doctrines mean that, unless the patent 
describes the very first printing press, it is unlikely that all printing presses 
will fall within the scope of the patent’s claims.33 And, as Ed Kitch once 
pointed out in a different context, some substitutes to the patented 
technology will be found in older technologies.34 But it seems cold comfort 
to argue that granting the first patent on the printing press still leaves the 
public to make, use, and sell all the hand-written manuscripts that they care 
to.35 Neither does this fully address the free speech concern: the burden on 
speech created by assigning exclusive rights in new, rapid, and cheap 
conduits of speech is hardly made more palatable by the continued 
availability of older, slower, and more expensive forms of speech. 
                                                 
29. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002). 
30. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 43–44 (1968); Mark 
Rose, The Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright: Areopagitica, the Stationers’ Company, and 
the Statute of Anne, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 67, 81–84 
(Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently eds., 2010). Despite robust printing censorship in 
the American colonies, the lack of a similar state-guild licensing partnership in the American colonies 
seems to have sent U.S. copyright law down a different path. Oren Bracha, Early American Printing 
Privileges: The Ambivalent Origins of Authors’ Copyright in America, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY 89, 
98–99. 
31. PATTERSON, supra note 30 at 78–79. 
32. The close relationship between printing and inventive monopolies extends at least back to 
Renaissance Venice, where printing privileges encompassed both the device used to print and the output 
of the press. See Joanna Kostylo, From Gunpowder to Print: The Common Origins of Patent and 
Copyright, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 19, 26, 38 (Ronan 
Deazley, Martin Kretschmer, & Lionel Bentley eds., 2010). 
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2018). 
34. Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31 (1986). 
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2016) (conferring on patent holders the exclusive rights to make, 
use, sell, offer for sale, and import the claimed invention). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Today perhaps the equivalent to exclusive rights in a printing press might 
be assigning exclusive rights in publication technology such as word 
processing software. A patent on a given word processor need not 
necessarily preclude use of all word processors. But in some cases, 
substitutes may be unavailable, or impractical. Figure 2 shows one of the 
explanatory flow chart drawings from a 2002 patent on a method of real-
time signal processing, a technology important to cellular wireless 
communications. In fact, this patent was one of those at issue in an ongoing 
dispute between cellphone manufacturers, Apple and Motorola/Google.36 
The technology claimed in the patent was adopted as a technical standard, 
considered essential to the interoperation of cellular telecommunications 
devices.37 The need for technical compatibility, and the network effects 
accompanying a technical standard, likely mean that exclusion from use of 
the standard means exclusion from developing or providing cellular 
communication devices.38 
                                                 
36. See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by Williamson 
v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
37. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1889 (2002) (explaining the selection processes for technical standards). 
38. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998) (discussing the exclusionary economics of technical standards); 
Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1159 (2017) 
(same). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
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Figure 2 
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This is not to say that governmental regulation of communication devices 
is never permissible; as we shall see, in some cases it is.39 Neither is it to 
say that patents on communication technologies are impermissible, nor even 
that patents are a type of regulation that necessarily run afoul of the First 
Amendment. With sufficiently good reasons, and a properly crafted 
regulation, the government can sometimes regulate or burden speech 
consistent with the First Amendment. At this point I simply wish to establish 
that patents can and sometimes do raise First Amendment issues that require 
constitutional scrutiny. We will come presently to consideration of the 
proper type of First Amendment scrutiny and to the likely outcome of such 
scrutiny.40  
Which brings us to the next, corollary proposition that I wish to establish. 
The examples I have shown, covering printing press devices or mobile 
cellular communication devices, are patents governing the making and use 
of the means of communications, or conduits of speech. While 
governmental restrictions on access to such technologies surely raise 
freedom of expression issues, students of the First Amendment will know 
that the most searching and stringent First Amendment review has 
traditionally been saved for governmental regulation that restricts the 
content or message of speech.41 So it may be that if exclusive patent rights 
over communication are limited to the kinds of examples I have pointed out 
so far, perhaps patents do not raise the most difficult or problematic kinds 
of First Amendment issues. 
But again to the contrary, it is fairly simple to find patents that restrict 
content or types of speech rather than the means of speech.42 For example, 
Figure 3 displays the cover page from a 2007 patent on methods of Internet 
advertising. Rather than a patent directed to a tool or conduit used to 
facilitate speech, this patent is directed to a communicative method—to 
speech itself. While the method is intended to be implemented using a 
computer system, it is directed to editing, style, and content of commercial 
messages. Although the Supreme Court has sometimes treated commercial 
speech differently than other forms of speech,43 it remains protected 
speech—and indeed, the claims of this patent are not limited to commercial 
messages, but might include non-commercial postings and notices. 
                                                 
39. See infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra Section III. 
41. See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231 (2012); Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); Susan H. 
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991).  
42. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 590 (listing a variety of issued patents restricting expression); see 
also Chiang, supra note 8, at 11–15 (discussing examples of issued patents restricting expression). 
43. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L. J. 981 (2009); 
Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153 (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
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Figure 3 
 
Similarly, Figure 4 is drawn from a 1997 patent disclosing and claiming 
the “Unistroke” method and system for handwriting recognition, developed 
by Xerox and famously employed as the “Graffiti” writing system for Palm 
handheld computing devices that were common during the late twentieth 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and early twenty-first centuries.44 The invention is claimed as a method of 
handwriting recognition, and the claims recite associated devices for 
detection and translation to coordinate databases. But within those 
constraints, the patent claims specific systems of symbolic representation 
for alphanumeric characters—in other words, writing. Certainly the 
government grant of exclusive use of forms of writing raises First 
Amendment issues; the patent claims not merely devices that carry 
messages, but the use of symbols that comprise the message itself. 
                                                 
44. See Rob Walker, Interface Runes, DESIGN OBSERVER (July 9, 2012), https://designobserver. 
com/feature/interface-runes/35108 [https://perma.cc/S5ZD-ZYHH] (discussing the history of Palm’s 
Graffiti handwriting system). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
  
 
 
 
 
2018] PATENTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 211 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
As a final example of patents directed to the content of expression, 
Figure 5 depicts a flowchart drawn from a captivatingly droll and recursive 
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turn of the century patent claiming a machine and method for drafting 
patents.45 Once again the claims recite device limitations including input, 
output, and storage devices, but these would be common to any computing 
device used for text or word processing. Within such loose constraints, the 
patent purports to grant exclusive rights over a process for writing and 
drafting a particular type of document with particular expressive content. 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
                                                 
45. U.S. Patent 6,049,811 (issued Apr. 11, 2000). 
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B. Software and Expression 
It is clear from the previous examples that a number of patented 
technologies, ranging from the mechanical printing press to digital writing 
and Internet communications, implicate the First Amendment. But much of 
Judge Mayer’s Intellectual Ventures concurrence—not to mention the 
criticism that followed it—concerned the provenance of a particular 
technology, software, within patentable subject matter. Mayer’s 
concurrence linked the problems related to software patents with problems 
related to freedom of expression;46 and this relationship has likewise been 
the focus of my previous work regarding patents and the First 
Amendment.47 Before moving further in our consideration of patents and 
expressive freedom, the peculiar place of software in the discussion requires 
some background explanation. 
The examples discussed above should establish that the range of 
patentable inventions subject to First Amendment scrutiny lies along a 
continuum. At one end of the range lie inventions that might facilitate 
speech and which, if sufficiently novel and non-obvious, might also be 
patentable: a new form of printing press, or a word processor, 
telecommunications devices, or other conduits that might record, carry, or 
distribute protected expression. These are new technologies that fall 
squarely within the intended technical subject matter of patent law, and that 
Congress unquestionably intended to promote with the financial promise of 
a patent. But of course the patent restricts, at least to some degree, access to 
and employment of the communicative technology. 
At the other end of the continuum lie a very different set of “inventions”: 
those that constitute speech themselves.48 During the heyday of the Federal 
Circuit’s State Street Bank doctrine, which allowed patents on any human 
creation that might produce a “useful result,”49 patents issued on an almost 
unlimited variety of process claims, which might include the examples 
                                                 
46. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Mayer, J., concurring). 
47. See Burk, supra note 4 (analyzing the issues raised by software as both patentable subject 
matter and protected speech).  
48. Cf. Chiang, supra note 8 (distinguishing between patents covering expressive conduits and 
patents covering expression). Professor Chiang argues that the patents covering expression are “easy” 
cases for First Amendment application, and those directed to conduits of speech are more difficult cases. 
See id. at 6–7. It should be clear from the discussion below that I believe both are analytically 
challenging, although I would agree that they are analytically distinct. 
49. State St. Bank & Tr. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In 
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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above of methods of writing or of a method of advertising.50 The subject 
matter of such patents is clearly recognizable as core expressive activities 
that have traditionally been the primary concern of the First Amendment. In 
such instances the patent does not restrict access to or use of the means or 
technical conduit of expression; it restricts access to or use of the expression 
itself. 
Somewhere in the mushy middle of this spectrum lie software 
inventions, the subject of Judge Mayer’s consideration. Software occupies 
an odd position in First Amendment jurisprudence, just as it occupies an 
odd position in patent jurisprudence.51 Software by its nature creates a host 
of legal anomalies. In contexts outside of patent law, courts reviewing the 
governmental regulation of software have consistently concluded that it is a 
form of speech, and so entitled to First Amendment protection. In particular, 
past cases looking at First Amendment challenges to software export 
regulations have noted that computer code has expressive qualities that can 
communicate technical information among programmers and engineers.52 
At the same time, due to its functional, operational qualities, these courts 
have tended to conclude that software regulation is not content-based 
regulation of pure speech. They have therefore treated software as a hybrid 
form of expression, akin to expressive action, under the intermediate 
O’Brien level of scrutiny that is applied to expressive conduct.53  
In these judicial opinions, expressive conduct seemed the best First 
Amendment category for software due to the complex nature of software 
expressivity: software may be instantiated in a variety of formats, including 
human-readable written symbols, machine-readable coded records, or even 
as patterns of high and low voltages in a semiconductor device.54 
Modulation between these forms is routine and automatic, depending on the 
operating state of the computer. Thus, while software may be a text, it has 
                                                 
50. See John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (2011); Robert 
P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts 
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); John R Thomas, The Post-Industrial 
Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3 (2000). 
51. Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms 
and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990) (discussing the poor fit 
between software and patent law). 
52. See Junger v. Daly, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Bernstein v. United States, 176 
F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(acknowledging First Amendment protection for software); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 
273 F.3d 429 (2001) (upholding software regulation while acknowledging protected status of both 
source and object code). 
53. See infra notes 231–33 and accompanying text. 
54. See Dennis Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 
JURIMETRICS J. 33, 36–37 (1987) (explaining the levels of operation for computer code). 
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also been shrewdly characterized as a “text that behaves.”55 Software thus 
constitutes a machine built of text that instead of comprising dedicated, 
hardwired circuits, configures the circuits of a universal machine to perform 
specific functions.56  
Functionality, and machinery, fit squarely within the ambit of the patent 
system, so that directing patent claims to the software machine or to the 
behavior of the software machine would seem permissible within patent 
doctrine. But patents directed to text, symbols or indicia are problematic, 
potentially allowing patent protection to bleed over into expressive works 
reserved to copyright. 57 This problem has been apparent for some time. As 
Judge Mayer’s predecessor on the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Archer 
observed in this regard: 
Consider for example the discovery or creation of music, a new song. 
Music of course is not patentable subject matter; a composer cannot 
obtain exclusive patent rights for the original creation of a musical 
composition. But now suppose the new melody is recorded on a 
compact disc. In such case, the particular musical composition will 
define an arrangement of minute pits in the surface of the compact 
disc material, and therefore will define its specific structure. . . . 
Alternatively suppose the music is recorded on the rolls of a player 
piano or music box. . . . [I]f a claim to a compact disc or piano roll 
containing a newly discovered song were regarded as a 
“manufacture” and within § 101 simply because of the specific 
physical structure of the compact disc, the “practical effect” would 
be the granting of a patent for a discovery in music.58 
These examples are not chosen by happenstance; the piano roll is part of a 
technological lineage that begins with the Jacquard loom, in which holes 
were punched in cards to encode complex designs for woven fabric, through 
Hollerith’s punched card census recording devices, through the punch cards 
and punch tapes used to program early computers.59 Punch cards have long 
                                                 
55. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2320 (1994). 
56. Id. at 2320, 2323. 
57. Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries Between Copyright and Patent 
Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1524 (2017). 
58. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553–54 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
59. See Michael M. Geselowitz, The Jacquard Loom: A Driver of the Industrial Revolution, THE 
INSTITUTE (July 18, 2016), http://theinstitute.ieee.org/tech-history/technology-history/the-jacquard-
loom-a-driver-of-the-industrial-revolution [https://perma.cc/A7DC-LLZE]. The same technology is of 
course the source of the famous “hanging chads” of punched card voting devices. See RICHARD HASEN, 
THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 12 (2012). 
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since been replaced by magnetic or optical media that record bits of data as 
reflective pits, differential voltages, or magnetic flux, but the binary nature 
of the record remains the same.  
One might be tempted to simply derogate the piano roll or compact disc 
to the copyright system, which explicitly covers the musical compositions 
contemplated by Judge Archer.60 But piano rolls have a fraught history in 
copyright, having been famously rejected by the Supreme Court as subjects 
for copyright, regardless of what they encoded.61 The Court reasoned, 
consonant with Judge Archer’s dissent, that such items were parts of a 
machine, lying outside the copyright system.62 Thereafter Congress 
explicitly amended the copyright statute to include works that are perceived 
with the aid of a machine, but this only exacerbates the difficulty in 
accommodating works that are the machine, and copyright law continues to 
struggle with such hybrids.63 
Thus a “machine built of text” has nowhere to lay its head, either in the 
regime designed to accommodate texts or in the regime designed to 
accommodate machines. Even though computer programs are covered by 
copyright, copyright law struggles with its treatment of software because of 
its functional qualities—the Supreme Court has long held that functional 
subject matter belongs in the patent system.64 Patent law, on the other hand, 
struggles with software because of its expressive, or at least communicative, 
formulations.65 Copyright law is not equipped to deal with functional 
subject matter; patent law is not equipped to deal with expressive subject 
matter.66 In particular, it is clear that patent law is not equipped to deal with 
expression that is subject to constitutional guarantees of freedom. This will 
be a problem for every patent involving computer code, but as we have seen, 
may also sometimes be a problem for other patentable communication 
technologies, from mechanical printing presses to digital 
telecommunications standards. 
 
                                                 
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2017) (specifying musical compositions as copyrightable subject 
matter). 
61. See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
62. Id. 
63. See Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994). 
64. See Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 
1293 (2017); Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope 
of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2006). 
65. See Burk, supra note 4. 
66. Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests 
for Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215 (2017). 
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C. Doctrinal Limitations and Exceptions 
It should be clear, then, that not only software patents, but many other 
categories of patentable subject matter, raise First Amendment concerns. 
But perhaps such problem patents can be culled out of the system. In his 
concurrence, Judge Mayer argued that patent doctrine itself, in the form of 
subject matter exclusion, could avoid or at least ameliorate First 
Amendment conflicts.67 Can patent law as presently constituted, or as 
optimally applied, accommodate the guarantee of expressive freedom? The 
answer to the question is that patent law almost certainly cannot save itself, 
and should undergo the same constitutional scrutiny required of other 
regulation of protected expression. But before exploring such scrutiny, let 
us first dispose of Judge Mayer’s proposed solutions. 
First Judge Mayer draws a comparison to fair use or similar limitations 
in copyright.68 I have already mentioned above that patent law lacks the 
doctrinal features that copyright, the form of intellectual property explicitly 
covering expressive works, deploys to accommodate protected speech. 
According to the Supreme Court, First Amendment conflicts in copyright 
can be avoided by user exceptions, such as the fair use doctrine, or by 
structural subject matter exclusion, such as the idea/expression dichotomy.69 
The former allows unauthorized use of copyrighted works for purposes that 
include First Amendment activities such as scholarship, criticism, 
commentary, and news reporting;70 the latter allows copyright only on the 
expression of an idea, and not even on the expression of the idea if 
alternative forms of expression are unavailable.71 Whether such carve-outs 
fully effectuate the constitutional guarantees of freedom for speech and 
press is a matter of perennial debate.72 But at least some doctrinal latitude 
for free speech is available. 
As I and some subsequent commentators have demonstrated, patent 
doctrine largely lacks any ameliorating mechanisms that would parallel 
                                                 
67. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
68. Id. at 1323. 
69. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
70. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
71. See Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'Y U.S.A. 417 (2016) (explaining copyright idea/expression doctrine). 
72. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or 
Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010); Neil Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on 
Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. Rev. (2013); David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests 
and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C.L. Rev. 1393 (2009); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, 
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, F(r)ee Expression - 
Reconciling Copyright and the First Amendment, 57 CAS. W. RES. U.L. REV. 863 (2007); Tushnet, supra 
note 2; Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, the First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 673 (2003).  
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copyright’s accommodation to the First Amendment.73 Unlike copyright 
law, patent law has few if any of the user privileges and exemptions that 
allow unauthorized use of expressive materials. In particular, patent law 
lacks any clear analog to copyright’s fair use provisions, which the Supreme 
Court has characterized as a type of safety valve between expressive 
freedom and copyright exclusivity, accommodating a range of protected 
speech interests.74 The few patent law exemptions that might accommodate 
portions of the fair use function, such as patent law’s experimental use 
exemption, have in recent years been judicially narrowed or qualified to the 
point that it is not clear whether they have any continued efficacy.75 
This is not to say that patent doctrine, properly invigorated, could not 
provide at least partial remedies to First Amendment conflicts. Kevin 
Collins has suggested that patent law offers a kind of wholistic screen 
against the incorporation of expressive subject matter into patents.76 One 
might also expect some of the heavy lifting needed in culling out expressive 
subject matter could be performed by patent law’s “printed matter doctrine,” 
which provides that the arrangement of symbolic indicia or markings cannot 
constitute the novel, patentable features of a patent eligible invention.77 The 
patent may be properly directed to a substrate or apparatus that incorporates 
printed matter, but the content of markings or symbols as such are excluded 
from consideration when assessing the patentability of a claimed 
invention.78  
The printed matter prohibition is a historic doctrine, sometimes 
denigrated by the Federal Circuit, and which for some time appeared to have 
fallen into desuetude.79 The Federal Circuit has declined invitations to apply 
the doctrine to expressive software code.80 But it has seen something of a 
revival in recent Federal Circuit opinions such as King Pharmaceuticals, 
                                                 
73. See Burk, supra note 4; O’Rourke, supra note 7; Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 
2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011). But see Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603 (2017) (arguing that patent law has some structural filters against expressive 
content). 
74. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). But see Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 
YALE L.J. 536 (2004) (challenging the role of fair use in promoting First Amendment values). 
75. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconsidering Experimental Use, 50 AKRON L. REV. 699 
(2017). 
76. See Collins, supra note 73. 
77. In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (rejecting a patent application for indexing 
the names in directories and dictionaries); see also Burk, supra note 4, at 141–42 (reviewing the printed 
matter doctrine). 
78. In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1337–38 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004).  
79. Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 
IND. L.J. 1379, 1381 (2010). 
80. See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc.81 The Eon Labs decision concerned a method patent 
to administration of a known drug with food; the patentee had developed 
data showing that administration with food increased the efficacy of the 
drug. Patients had long taken the drug with food, but in order to avoid an 
upset stomach, rather than to increase efficacy.82 Thus, the drug lacked 
novelty, and the method of administration lacked novelty; the only novel 
aspect of the method was the information that taking the drug with food 
would increase efficacy.  
The patentees attempted to work this point of novelty into the claims by 
reciting method claims that included either instructing a patient to take the 
drug with food to increase efficacy, or printing this information on the label 
under which the drug was dispensed. The Federal Circuit invalidated the 
claims; citing the printed matter cases, the Court held that the novelty of the 
invention could not permissibly lie in the information printed on the label 
of the drug’s container.83 And while the doctrine is technically the “printed 
matter” doctrine, and oral communications are not printed, the CAFC panel 
held that oral instructions equivalent to a text are also included within the 
doctrine’s prohibitions. 
In the Eon Labs decision, the printed matter doctrine steers patentable 
subject matter away from methods that entail either oral communication of 
patient instruction or the printed equivalent of such instructions.84 Thus the 
doctrine helps avoid granting exclusive rights in expressive conduct that 
might ether run afoul of First Amendment prohibitions on prior restraint, or 
simply the “chilling effect” attending potential damages liability for claimed 
speech or text. But, even if it were vigorously applied, the printed matter 
doctrine addresses only some First Amendment issues within the patent 
system. It would not, for example, resolve the concerns raised above with 
regard to printing presses, methods of advertising, or networking protocols. 
The claims in such patents either do not constitute communicative symbols 
or indicia, or, as in the case of the “Unistroke” patent, the claims are drafted 
so as to tie such symbols to structural or functional aspects of hardware. 
Consequently, a robust printed matter exception would offer at best a partial 
solution to First Amendment conflicts. This should not be surprising; in 
copyright the Supreme Court has suggested that a combination of doctrines 
                                                 
81. 616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
82. Id. at 1275–76. 
83. Id. at 1278–79. 
84. See In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“printed matter by itself is not 
patentable subject matter, because non-statutory, . . . .”). 
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accommodates expressive freedom.85 In patent law, it remains unclear what 
combination of doctrinal elements might provide similar accommodation. 
D. Patentable Subject Matter 
Rather than rely upon exceptions such as the printed matter doctrine, 
Judge Mayer’s concurrence lays the burden of First Amendment 
reconciliation on the patent statute’s subject matter provisions.86 Section 
101 of the United States patent statute, which was the subject of the 
Intellectual Ventures decision and the focus of Judge Meyers’ concurrence, 
sets forth four general categories of patentable subject matter: processes, 
machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter.87 As I have 
discussed at some length in other work, the first of these differs substantially 
from the others; machines, manufactures, and compositions are all 
categories of tangible materials, whereas processes constitute relationships 
between such materials.88  
Little wonder, then, that the majority of the expressive patent examples 
I have cited above are process patents; to define relationships among 
material objects is to define information transfer.89 While some expressive 
patents, such as printing presses, will fall into one of the material product 
patent categories, communicative or expressive freedoms will most often be 
implicated in process patents. Relatedly, most of the Supreme Court’s 
modern jurisprudence regarding patent eligible subject matter has been 
directed to consideration of categorical exclusions that are intended to deter 
the most problematic process claims. Out of eight opinions in the last thirty 
years, only two have dealt with product patents,90 and the remainder have 
all dealt with process patents.91 And all but one of these process cases, 
including the most recent, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, have been software 
cases.92 
There is no indication in the Supreme Court’s decisions that it has 
selected these cases in explicit response to concerns regarding expressive 
freedom, although such concerns have not gone unrecognized. The question 
of patented speech has been posed to the Supreme Court in amicus 
                                                 
85. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2011). 
86. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp. 838 F.3d 1307, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
87. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
88. See Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 608–09; 
Dan L Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 563–64 (2006). 
89. See Burk, The Problem of Process, supra note 88, at 587. 
90. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (regarding 
DNA sequences); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (regarding microorganisms). 
91. Burk, supra note 10, at 520–22. 
92. The lone process patent exception is Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab. Inc., 566 
U.S. 66 (2012), a case regarding medical diagnostic methods. 
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arguments that may have had some effect on the Supreme Court’s decisions 
and which most likely prompted Judge Mayer’s widely discussed and 
derided concurrence.93 Many or most of the assertions made by Judge 
Mayer are familiar from amicus arguments raised before the Supreme 
Court: that expansive patents generally, and software patents particularly, 
seem wholly incompatible with the guarantees in the First Amendment, that 
such patents threaten scientific and technical speech, and that more stringent 
subject matter exclusions would help to ameliorate such threats.94 
But rather than the result of amicus arguments, concerns regarding 
expressive freedom are an inevitable corollary to the Court’s Section 101 
jurisprudence. In none of its subject matter cases has the Supreme Court has 
dealt so much with issues regarding the categories defined by the statute as 
with unwritten exclusions from those categories. Although the statute says 
not a word about excluded categories of subject matter, the Supreme Court 
has declared that abstract ideas, mental processes, and naturally occurring 
phenomena including mathematics cannot of themselves be patent 
eligible.95 Indeed, the Alice Corp. opinion sets out a two-part test for dealing 
with patentable subject matter, and identifying the presence of any such 
excluded categories forms the first step of the subject matter test.96 Once a 
patent is found to incorporate a category of excluded subject matter, it can 
only pass the second step of the Alice test if it implements the excluded 
category in some inventive way.97 
Not being themselves material, the relationships among material 
objects—that is to say, processes—naturally tend toward abstraction when 
described in a patent. And when mapping software to the four subject 
categories under Section 101, it quickly becomes clear that software may be 
described or instantiated as a product, such as a machine or as a 
manufacture, but the most natural fit is to the category of process, that is, 
the set of relational states between such objects. Thus, there is a natural 
intersection between processes and the forbidden subject matter category of 
abstract ideas, and so also between software and forbidden subject matter, 
attracting the repeated attention of the Supreme Court98 and of course Judge 
Mayer.99 This has made software one of the “problem children” of the patent 
                                                 
93. See supra note 12. 
94. See supra note 12. 
95. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70. 
96. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
97. Id. 
98. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347. 
99. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Mayer, J., concurring). 
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system,100 not simply because processes tend toward abstraction but 
because, as indicated above, essentially any process, including forbidden 
mental processes and natural phenomena, that can be described in a text can 
be implemented as software.101 
Judge Mayer’s proposed solution to patent law’s ongoing First 
Amendment problem is to purge the patent system of troublesome software 
patents by stringent application of the Alice subject matter test.102 But 
despite its valid core insight, Judge Mayer’s argument manifestly cannot be 
quite right; subject matter restrictions may serve to screen out certain 
problematic claims, but cannot and will not screen out all of them. Consider 
as a concrete example the patented “Unistroke” method and system for 
handwriting recognition, offered as an example above.103 Applying step one 
of the Alice test, we ask whether a forbidden category is implicated by the 
claims: is there something like a law of nature, an abstract idea, a product 
of nature, a mental process, or similar prohibited category found in relation 
to the claims? The answer is likely yes. The claims might be characterized 
as encompassing an abstract idea, specifically, writing alphanumeric 
symbols in a single stroke. Although the claims specify defined apparatus 
such as a stylus and touch-sensitive screen, Alice and other Supreme Court 
decisions tell us that claims encompassing a forbidden category cannot be 
saved simply by the recitation of conventional apparatus.104 
Moving then to Alice step two, we ask whether there is in the claims 
some inventive concept that makes the claimed system “something more” 
than simply attempting to patent the forbidden subject matter. In this 
particular case, are the claims simply an attempt to patent the idea of writing 
symbols in a single stroke? The claims, again, recite use of a stylus, pressure 
sensitive interface, and other apparatus along with the simplified symbols 
in order to allow machine recognition of handwriting. The claims are not 
drawn to the simplified alphabet alone. The presence of hardware or 
apparatus in the claims will not by itself insulate the patent from subject 
matter exclusion.105 But the “Unistroke” method claims are directed to solve 
the problem of handwriting recognition by computer hardware. Such an 
advance in computer science likely qualifies as an “inventive concept.”106 
                                                 
100. See Burk, Patent Law’s Problem Children, supra note 11, at 187. 
101. See Philip E. Agre, Internet Research: For and Against, in INTERNET RESEARCH ANNUAL: 
SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNET RESEARCHERS CONFERENCES 2000–2002, at 
25, 27 (Mia Consalvo et al. eds., 2004). 
102. 838 F.3d at 1325. 
103. U.S. Patent 5,596,656 (filed Oct. 26 1995). 
104. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358–59 (2014); Mayo 
Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–80 (2012). 
105. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358–59. 
106. Id. at 2359 (permissible claims could “improve the functioning of the computer itself” or 
“effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.”). 
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Consequently Alice step two is probably satisfied, and the system meets 
Section 101 criteria. 
But this outcome does not in any way resolve the question of prohibitions 
or burdens on protected speech inherent in the patent. Despite passing the 
Alice criteria, the Unistroke patent still implicates the First Amendment, 
subjecting a specific method of expressive communication to private 
exclusivity. This is not to say that the patent system generally, or this 
particular patent as applied, may not pass First Amendment muster; many 
types of governmental regulation of speech are permissible, depending upon 
the type of regulation and the level of scrutiny that it merits. But clearly in 
this case, and doubtless many others, the Alice criteria will not exclude from 
the patent system inventions that raise First Amendment questions. The 
patents on such inventions will instead have to undergo scrutiny as dictated 
by First Amendment doctrine. 
II. EXCEPTIONS TO PROTECTED EXPRESSION 
It seems clear from the preceding discussion that we cannot rely on 
patent law to avoid First Amendment issues, neither under current subject 
matter exclusions, nor for that matter under Judge Mayer’s proposed regime 
in which Supreme Court subject matter limitations are strictly enforced and 
software patents somehow vanish from consideration. Skeptics might 
therefore turn to a different solution, relying on the set of exceptions 
surrounding the First Amendment, hoping free speech doctrines might 
categorically exclude patents from the ambit of the First Amendment.107  
Most such objections cluster around some version of the argument that 
patents constitute private property rights, and so are in some way exempt 
from the First Amendment. This line of reasoning has been thrown into 
question by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that patents are 
purely creatures of statutory creation, constituting “public franchises” rather 
than private property.108 But even without plumbing the murky depths of the 
Court’s public rights doctrines,109 and rather following closely the 
admonition of the patent statute that patents are to have the “attributes of 
personal property,”110 we can lay such arguments aside. If patent law has 
                                                 
107. See Frederick Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 
346, 348–49 (2014–2015) (cataloging forms of speech that lie beyond the scope of the First 
Amendment). 
108. Oil States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (holding 
that patents are public rights rather than private rights). 
109. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 488 (2011) (noting that the Court’s cases on public 
rights have “not been entirely consistent.”). 
110. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018). 
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not developed so as to avoid conflict with the First Amendment, neither has 
First Amendment law developed so as to avoid conflict with patents. 
A. An Implausible “Patent Exception” 
One potential escape from the problem of expressive patents might be 
sought in analogy to patent law’s constitutional sibling, copyright. 
Specifically, when confronted with potential conflicts between copyright 
and expressive freedom, the Supreme Court has generally sidestepped any 
explicit First Amendment analysis, and has instead simply declared 
copyright free of First Amendment scrutiny. In a set of cases directly 
addressing the potential conflicts between copyright and the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has carved out what Professor Volokh has 
dubbed the “copyright exception” to protected speech.111 Just as categories 
of speech such as obscenity, fighting words, imminent incitement to 
violence, or child pornography receive either no First Amendment 
protection at all, or radically lessened levels of First Amendment 
protection,112 so it seems that speech subject to copyright receives 
diminished or altered First Amendment coverage.  
As in every other exception to protected speech, the Court has articulated 
a rationale as to why copyrighted speech should receive special treatment. 
The same is true for the copyright exception. We might therefore inquire 
whether patents, authorized under the same constitutional clause as 
copyrights, also might constitute a First Amendment exception, and in 
particular whether patents fit the exception rationale articulated for 
copyrights. The available evidence strongly suggests that patents likely do 
not. 
1. Following Traditional Contours  
The concept of a patent—or a copyright—exception to the First 
Amendment somewhat flies in the face of the constitutional text; if 
anything, one might expect quite the opposite reading. Typically, later 
amendments to a legal text, whether statutory, contractual, testamentary, or 
constitutional, are understood to supersede the previous text. So the Twenty-
First Amendment explicitly repeals the Eighteenth Amendment,113 and the 
Thirteenth Amendment implicitly modifies the Census Clause of Article 1, 
                                                 
111. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 
44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 713 (2003). 
112. See Schauer, supra note 107. 
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
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section 2, clause 3.114 One might therefore logically read the prohibition on 
regulation abridging freedom of speech or of the press in the First 
Amendment as modifying or eliminating previous constitutional provisions 
that regulate speech, in particular the Intellectual Property Clause of Article 
1, section 8, clause 8. Under such a reading, the First Amendment simply 
supersedes whatever laws Congress might pass under the patent power 
respecting freedom of speech or of the press. 
But the text has never been read this way, at least in the case of copyright, 
which also arises out of the Intellectual Property Clause, and which directly 
regulates expressive works that are unquestionably protected by the First 
Amendment. Rather, the two constitutional provisions have been read in 
tandem, and the Supreme Court has treated the text as essentially 
contemporaneous. On this semi-originalist rationale, the Court has reasoned 
that the two constitutional provisions were adopted close in time to one 
another, so that the framers knew about each and we can infer that they 
neither intended nor anticipated any conflict between the two.115 
The Court has also relied on a related but more elaborate trope: that the 
“traditional contours” of copyright will ensure that copyright and the First 
Amendment remain compatible.116 Specifically, the fair use doctrine and the 
idea-expression distinction are said by the Court to have been intended to 
accommodate First Amendment concerns.117 Thus, a copyright system 
incorporating these features avoids First Amendment scrutiny because it 
already satisfies whatever policies the Framers intended to be 
accommodated at the intersection of the two provisions. 
Finally, in a similar vein, the Court has suggested that copyright may be 
seen to promote rather than to conflict with the purposes of the First 
Amendment.118 This rationale argues that copyright furthers the objectives 
of the First Amendment by providing incentives to invest in more speech 
than might otherwise be expressed. On this view, the copyright clause is an 
“engine of free expression” that promotes more copious expression in 
tandem with the First Amendment.119 On this reasoning, copyright may 
restrict particular expression in the short term, but will be overall beneficial 
for expression in the long term. An extreme version of this view, articulated 
                                                 
114. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV (counting the whole number of persons in each state) with 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting “other persons” who are not free or indentured as three-fifths of 
a person). 
115. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
116. Id. at 221. 
117. Id. at 219; Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012). 
118. Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). See also generally 
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008) (exploring the conflicting roles of 
copyright in promoting and burdening speech). 
119. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
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by Marci Hamilton, is that the original constitution contained no free speech 
clause because the Framers expected free speech concerns to be fully 
satisfied by the exercise of the copyright power.120 
The Supreme Court has never gone so far as to adopt Professor 
Hamilton’s conjecture, and indeed the Court’s rationale of 
contemporaneous adoption would suggest that the Framers expected the 
First Amendment to do different work than the copyright power; otherwise 
the First Amendment becomes surplusage. But to the extent that such 
originalist rationales have been advanced by the Supreme Court, one might 
imagine similar reasoning applied to the parallel patent power derived from 
the Intellectual Property Clause. And while I have shown above that patent 
infringement and subject matter exemptions will not eliminate expressive 
content from the ambit of the patent system, the Court’s jurisprudence from 
patent law’s constitutional sibling system of copyright suggests that they 
could possibly play a different role, by demarcating a patent exception to 
the First Amendment.  
However, this view partakes of the same problems inherent in the Court’s 
fairly dubious rationales for the copyright exception. For example, the 
Supreme Court has never held that the Commerce Power is exempt from 
First Amendment constraint, even though the Commerce Clause and the 
First Amendment, like the Intellectual Property Clause and the First 
Amendment, were adopted close together in time. Similarly, the “traditional 
contours” rationale is probably largely nonsense, as both the fair use and 
idea/expression doctrines on which the Court relies appear to be of later 
vintage than the constitutional framing.121 Neither is it likely that the 
Framers, whatever their view of copyright in the Eighteenth Century, 
foresaw how copyright would encompass the range of artistic and 
expressive works that were added to the statute later. Indeed, both copyright 
and the First Amendment have come to encompass later and problematic 
advances in communications such as motion pictures, sound recordings, and 
software.122  
It likely does even less good to imagine the Framers’ intent regarding 
patent law and the First Amendment than it does to imagine their intent for 
                                                 
120. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 325 (2002) (quoting statements by Marci Hamilton in an address delivered to 
the American Association of Law Schools Section on Defamation and Privacy, January 1998). 
121. Oren Bracha traces the origins of fair use to opinions of Justice Story in the late 1830s, and 
the idea/expression dichotomy to evolving copyright conceptions during the mid to late 1800s—some 
forty to fifty years after the passage of the first U.S. copyright statute. Oren Bracha, The Ideology of 
Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE 
L.J. 186, 229–30, 234 (2008). 
122. See Samuelson, supra note 120 (discussing the economic and technological departures of 
current copyright from its historical limits). 
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copyright. True, following the Supreme Court’s lead in the copyright 
sphere, we might argue that the Patent Clause and the First Amendment 
were adopted close together in time, so that the Framers may have believed 
the two to be compatible when adopted. But neither the patent system nor 
the jurisprudence of the First Amendment today look anything like whatever 
might have been contemplated by the Framers. The ongoing development 
of technology, notably software, has shifted the patent system to encompass 
forms of expression utterly unforeseeable to the Framers. To the extent that 
there might have been expectations in the late Eighteenth Century regarding 
the “traditional contours” of patent law and the First Amendment, it seems 
more likely that the two were at that time largely unrelated and that neither 
had any real bearing on the other.  
One might take from Judge Mayer’s concurrence the message that 
something like patent law’s “traditional contours” of subject matter could 
and would avoid entanglement with the First Amendment, by excluding 
problematic categories such as software from the patent system. But relying 
on subject matter exclusions rather than user exemptions is highly 
problematic. Congressional intent for the patent system, as confirmed 
repeatedly by the Supreme Court, seems to be that it should broadly 
encompass new technologies.123 I have argued elsewhere that as a policy 
matter, this is the only approach to patent innovation that makes any sense; 
Congress cannot be expected to vet every new form of technology for 
statutory consideration as it is developed.124 Enacting a flexible statute that 
applies to all types of technical areas is the more viable approach. Turning 
back the clock to limit patentable subject matter to familiar technologies, 
and certainly limiting it to those simple mechanical and technical arts 
familiar to the Framers, seems unworkable and counterproductive.  
An alternative version of the copyright exception might argue that 
patents constitute an “engine of free expression” that create incentives for 
investment in developing new forms of printing presses and 
telecommunications protocols. One might argue that the Framers expected 
the patent system to promote speech by encouraging new technologies such 
as an improved printing press, and that improved word processors or 
telecommunications protocols fulfill the same role, even if not precisely 
envisioned in the Eighteenth Century. Or, one might rely on the disclosure 
rationale for patenting for similar First Amendment consonance: under the 
“quid pro quo” theory of patenting, often embraced by the Supreme Court, 
patents are a type of bargain between the inventor and the public, trading 
                                                 
123. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
124. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE 
IT, 96–98 (2009).  
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disclosure of the claimed invention in return for two decades of exclusive 
rights.125 To the extent that patents prompt such disclosures, they might be 
thought of as an “engine of free expression” that promotes disclosure of 
scientific and technical information.126  
But such arguments do little to explain the most problematic expressive 
patents, for example, patents on methods of writing or methods of 
advertising, which the framers surely did not contemplate. And even 
accepting the “engine of free expression” arguments with regard to technical 
conduits of speech that the Framers might have intended does not justify a 
Patent Exception to guarantees of expressive freedom. Promoting 
innovative technologies may well promote speech, but the fact that patents 
do so does not change the applicability of the First Amendment. In every 
other conceivable scenario where the state engages in the development of 
conduits to promote speech—such as building auditoria or theaters, 
allocating broadcast spectrum,127 allocating grant funding,128 creating 
libraries,129 opening schools or universities to speakers—First Amendment 
principles apply. Such state activity may pass constitutional muster or it may 
not, but the activity is never immune. It is nearly impossible to see any 
reason why governmental efforts to promote the progress of the “useful 
arts” would be any different. 130 
2. Alternative Expression 
In any event, as we have already demonstrated, no doctrines parallel to 
fair use and the idea-expression distinction, contemporaneous with the 
Framers or not, has ever existed in patent law.131 This lack seems disabling 
to the rationales behind the copyright exception when applied to patents. 
For example, the availability of alternative conduits for speech has 
sometimes played a role in the First Amendment analysis of content 
regulation and government-granted privilege,132 and so this principle might 
form the basis for justifying copyright exclusivity in particular expression. 
This principle appears to at least implicitly underlie the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
125. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001); 
Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). 
126. See, e.g., Feroz, supra note 8 (suggesting a similar view). 
127. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also further discussion of spectrum 
infra notes 181–209 and accompanying text. 
128. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
129. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
130. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patents are intended to promote progress in the “useful 
arts.”). 
131. See supra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
132. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 661 (1994). 
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treatment of copyright exclusivity. The Court has opined that copyright 
restriction of content is permissible in part because copyright inheres only 
in particular expression, leaving other avenues open to express the same 
idea.133 Indeed, when few alternatives for expressing an idea are available, 
the idea and expression are said to have “merged” for copyright purposes, 
and copyright becomes unavailable.134  
It is not entirely clear as a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence 
whether this rationale is actually satisfactory; as Jed Rubenfeld and others 
have pointed out, under the First Amendment, speakers typically have a 
right to deploy to their preferred form of expression, even if other, 
unregulated alternative expressions are available.135 The availability of 
alternative modes of expression is generally only relevant for content-
neutral regulation,136 which copyright is clearly not.137 But even assuming 
that the Supreme Court’s copyright rationale regarding alternative modes of 
expression is defensible, it may not fit the mechanisms of patent exclusivity 
in the manner that it fits copyright. Unlike copyright, which is based on the 
instantiation of a particular work, patent is based on written claims that may 
incorporate multiple embodiments of the actual invention, depending on 
how expansive or constrained the language allowed by the Patent Office.138 
Consequently, patent protection is not necessarily confined to a single 
embodiment, but may rather extend to multiple embodiments falling within 
the scope of the claims.  
Thus, pursuing one of the examples from above, a patent on a method of 
Internet advertising excludes unauthorized uses of all advertising that 
conforms to the details of the patent claims, no matter what its specific 
content or exact style of expression. The number of alternative means 
available for advertising expression will depend upon the breadth of the 
patent’s claims; this language is negotiated with administrative officials in 
the Patent Office, depending upon the invention’s degree of novelty, 
obviousness, and disclosure as described in the patent application. In 
                                                 
133. Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
134. See Samuelson, supra note 71. Copyright in particular fixed expression will also extend to 
copied expression that is substantially similar to the protected work. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 
464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
135. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE 
L. J. 1, 14–15 (2002); Volokh, supra note 111, at 702. 
136. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in 
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 952 (1994). 
137. See Volokh, supra note 111, at 703–06. 
138. See Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 L. & LIT. 163, 168 
(2014). Patent law also provides through the Doctrine of Equivalents coverage of a penumbra of 
embodiments equivalent to those expressed in the claims. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731–32 (2002). Inclusion of unstated equivalents within the claims is 
intended to deal with the imprecision of claim language. Id.  
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general, patents with narrow claims to expression may leave open 
alternative methods, technologies, or content, but patents with broad claims 
may leave few or no alternatives. Consequently the “alternative expression” 
rationale applied to copyright cannot be applied in toto to the patent system, 
but only to individual narrowly drafted patents. 
The absence of alternative expressive means does not dictate that the 
patent system necessarily fails First Amendment scrutiny, nor even that 
broadly preclusive individual patents will fail. When we consider the 
treatment of other regulations contested in the past for First Amendment 
violations, the fact that all the available broadcast frequencies have been 
assigned, or that all the available time slots in the schedule of the public 
arena have been taken, so that other speakers may be excluded, does not by 
itself create a First Amendment violation. But neither does it excuse First 
Amendment scrutiny; the question then becomes whether the limited times 
or frequencies have been allocated in a manner that disadvantages some 
particular set of content or viewpoints; and if they have been disadvantaged, 
why. 
B. The Property Fallacy 
An alternative objection to the confluence of patents and free speech that 
has also sometimes been raised in the context of copyright,139 is that patents 
are immune from First Amendment scrutiny because they constitute 
property rights. Implicit in this argument seems to be the assertion that, like 
obscenity or fighting words, property rights constitute a kind of rights-free 
zone to which the First Amendment does not extend. Also implicit in the 
objection from property seems to be the assumption that a patent is 
analogous to privately held physical property, such as land, so that 
interference with the assertion of a patent is similar to interference with the 
private use of property.140 The comparison of patent to land is perennial 
favorite of patent law commentators, even though the dangers inherent in 
drawing any analogy between tangible and intellectual property are well 
known and fully vetted.141  
                                                 
139. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3 (discussing the apparent immunity of copyright from 
prior restraint doctrine). 
140. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 108, 109 (1990) (“Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with real 
property.”) 
141. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1031 
(2005). 
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In the instant case, the assumption that privately owned land is the proper 
analog may be especially misguided.142 The proper starting point for 
analogy may be instead the public domain; as Justice O’Connor once 
observed, the “free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the 
protection of a federal patent is the exception.”143 If open or publicly shared 
commons is the starting point, then the proper real estate analogy may be to 
licensing or permitting of public lands or thoroughfares, where expression 
by the public would be the norm but for the temporary governmental grant 
of patent exclusivity.144 A governmental warrant for exclusive use of a 
public park or sidewalk for expressive activity for a period of twenty years 
raises a rather different set of problems than does expressive access to 
private land, an issue to which we will return in a bit. 
But for the moment let us indulge the analogy to privately owned 
property as the proper comparison. This analogy neither solves nor 
eliminates the First Amendment question. Privately owned property, used 
to generate or to restrict expressive activity is by no means immune from 
regulation or from the requirements of the First Amendment. For example, 
in parallel analysis of copyright under the First Amendment, neither 
commentators nor the Supreme Court have argued that the designation of 
copyright as a form of property precludes significant intrusion on the scope 
of copyright exclusivity in order to accommodate free expression. Quite the 
contrary, we have seen that the Supreme Court has explicitly relied upon 
limiting doctrines such as fair use and the idea-expression distinction to 
avoid a constitutional conflict between the expressive rights guaranteed to 
the public and the exclusive rights granted to authors.145 Commentators tend 
to argue that such limiting doctrines are not nearly enough to avoid the 
conflict, but existing limitations are seen as at least the beginning, if not the 
end, of addressing First Amendment concerns.146 
The argument that patents are property immune from First Amendment 
scrutiny appears to stem from a tendency to treat exclusive rights granted 
under the Intellectual Property Clause as if they existed in a natural state, 
prior to intrusion by a speaker and her rights of expression. This is of course 
nonsense. Exclusive rights in copyright and patent are purely creatures of 
                                                 
142. Cf. Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 516 
(2014) (arguing that patent law is better thought of as a species of public law than private law). 
143. Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft, 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). 
144. Cf. Oil States Energy Serv. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) 
(“[T]he decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public 
franchise.”). 
145. See supra notes 69 –72 and accompanying text. 
146. Id.  
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Congressional creation, structured according to Congressional fiat.147 There 
is no constitutional requirement that Congress grant copyrights or patents, 
nor for the most part is there much of a constitutional requirement as to 
exactly what such exclusive rights must look like if they are granted. 
Congress could decide to stop granting patents tomorrow, or could, with the 
exception of a constitutionally required core of non-obviousness,148 
drastically alter their availability in terms of subject matter, disclosure, 
novelty, or utility. And Congress has in fact historically done so, for 
example recently altering the universe of prior art considered to determine 
novelty and non-obviousness.149 
There is, on the other hand, a very definite constitutional requirement 
that, no matter which of its enumerated powers it is exercising, Congress 
must refrain from unduly abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.150 
Simply declaring that a certain possessory interest constitutes property does 
not free it from First Amendment scrutiny; indeed, it rather begs the First 
Amendment question.151 The rights, responsibilities, and very designation 
of property do not spring forth spontaneously; property is, rather, a creature 
of state action. The exclusive rights entailed in property are a function of 
state regulatory recognition, and the state may define the breadth, duration, 
                                                 
147. A contrary view, relying on the argument that Congress through the patent power merely 
“secures” pre-existing rights to inventors, is found in Ron D. Katznelson, Private Patent Rights, the 
Patent Bargain, and the Fiction of Administrative “Error Correction” in Inter Partes Reviews (Dec. 4, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3077970. This reading of the Constitutional 
language makes little sense, as absent governmental action, the inventor has no exclusivity to prevent 
independent re-creation, reverse engineering, or even simple imitation of the invention. As Thomas 
Jefferson famously observed: 
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of society. It would 
be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural 
right, be claimed in exclusive and stable property. . . . Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a 
subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be 
done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from 
anybody.  
Thomas Jefferson, letter to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813. See also Oil States Energy Serv. LLC v. 
Greene’s Energy Grp. LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (holding that patents are statutorily created public 
rights rather than private rights). 
148. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (holding that patent non-obviousness is 
a constitutional requirement to “promote progress”).  
149. The recent statutory amendments in the America Invents Act eliminated some categories of 
prior art entirely, changed the geographic requirements for prior art, and shifted the critical date from 
the date of invention to the date of application filing. See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under 
the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023 (2012) (explaining the novelty provisions of the America Invents 
Act). The end result is that fewer inventions are likely to be novel or non-obvious than would have been 
prior to the amendments, because the critical date for comparison to the prior art now occurs later in 
time. 
150. See Rubenfeld, supra note 135, at 12–13 (explaining that constitutional rights always 
constrain governmental powers). 
151. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182. 
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and frequency of such rights in order to facilitate speech, or to avoid 
conflicts with the constitutional prohibition on the suppression of speech. 
Conversely, it would be deeply problematic from a First Amendment 
perspective if the state were able to elide all constitutional expression 
guarantees by simply declaring a given resource to be “property.”152 
Instead, property rights always entail a mélange of privileges and 
restrictions intended to accommodate a mix of public and private interests. 
The allocation of property, or the use of property, clearly may be regulated 
or curtailed in order to secure or promote constitutional speech guarantees. 
For example, real property, typically viewed as the paradigmatic subject for 
legal exclusivity,153 may be subject to a wide range of easements, 
restrictions, and regulation.154 This remains the case even where expressive 
uses are concerned. The use of real property as a private forum to convey a 
message is certainly subject to zoning, nuisance, and other restrictions. A 
long line of Supreme Court cases holds that expressive activities on land 
may be properly regulated where public impacts such as crime or traffic is 
anticipated.155  
Similarly, bullhorns. billboards, loudspeakers, and similar items 
constitute chattel property that facilitate protected speech, yet there is no 
question that the state can subject them and their associated expression to 
reasonable regulation, ranging from time, place, and manner restrictions to 
outright bans when warranted.156 Such regulations may be permissible or 
impermissible, depending on how the regulation in its given context fares 
under applicable First Amendment scrutiny. But the fact that some form of 
property is subjected to the regulation does not magically excuse the 
regulation from such scrutiny. 
An objection might be raised that these examples for the most part 
concern First Amendment review of direct state regulation of private 
property, either land or chattels, that is being used for communicative 
purposes—a loudspeaker, billboard, or bullhorn exceeds some reasonable 
degree of use and becomes a nuisance—whereas the question at issue is 
deployment of the First Amendment to justify an infringer’s intrusion on 
property rights in a patent. But even where the state regulation is intended 
to assist a landowner’s right to exclude, the regulation must pass First 
                                                 
152. See id. 
153. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
But see also Brett Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 
649 (2007) (critiquing the assumption of exclusivity for intellectual property rights).  
154. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 126 (1999). 
155. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
156. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (billboards). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
234 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:197 
 
 
 
Amendment scrutiny. For example, legal restrictions on access to private 
doorsteps and doorknobs may be trumped by the right of speakers—even 
annoying speakers—to initiate communication with landowners.157  
Moreover, this objection reveals the dangers inherent in analogizing 
exclusive rights in intellectual property with exclusive rights in tangible 
property, by misunderstanding that, as a form of intellectual property, the 
patent itself is an interference with the use of tangible property held by 
others. Governmental promulgation of patents authorizes state-enforced 
interference with the ability of chattel property owners, such as the owner 
of a given printing press, to use their item without permission of a patent 
holder. Such interference with the use of private property to convey a 
message raises First Amendment concerns. For example, in City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo, the Supreme Court held that a regulation preventing homeowners 
from displaying messages on their homes unconstitutionally interfered with 
the property owner’s ability to express speech in a manner that had no 
equivalent alternative.158 Similarly, a patent encompassing my printing 
press, my mobile telephone, or my word processor potentially interferes 
with my ability to use my own physical property to communicate my 
message in a manner that may have no equivalent alternative.159 
I have already suggested how patents broadly interfere with such 
alternatives.160 Alternative conduits for a message that has been barred from 
a patented channel will be sparse or non-existent because, unlike exclusive 
rights granted in physical property that are limited to a certain place and 
time, exclusive patent rights extend to all objects of a given type—or for 
process patents all actions of a given type—during the term of the patent.161 
Given the circumscribed nature of tangible property, it is somewhat rare to 
find cases in which a speaker is somehow constitutionally entitled to access 
particular property in order to engage in speech—a different place or similar 
                                                 
157. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943). 
158. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55–56 (1994) (“Displaying a sign from one’s own 
residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying 
the same text or picture by other means.”). 
159. The judicial doctrine of patent exhaustion will cut off a patent owner’s exclusive rights over 
alienation or use of a patented item after an authorized unrestricted sale of that item. See Impression 
Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 581 U.S. 1523 (2017). But exhaustion would not attach, for 
example, to independently created chattels, chattels not purchased under authorization of the patent 
owner, or to communicative processes unless practiced with devices purchased from the patent owner. 
See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (holding that an unrestricted 
authorized sale of devices embodying a patented process exhausts the patent owner’s exclusive rights in 
the process when practiced via those devices). Although the topic is beyond the scope of this paper, my 
analysis here suggests a potential First Amendment basis for a capacious patent exhaustion doctrine. 
160. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
161. See Rubenfeld, supra note 135, at 28 (suggesting a parallel argument with regard to 
copyright). 
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object is typically available. But where patents are concerned, such 
alternatives are precluded by exclusivity over the class of objects or actions, 
including objects not physically possessed or owned by the patent holder. It 
is thus far more sensible to conceive of the patent itself as constituting the 
governmental regulation requiring First Amendment review, rather than as 
a private property interest that is being curtailed by First Amendment 
requirements.162 
C. The State Action Question 
To some degree, the argument from property may stand as a proxy for a 
different argument, dealing with the constitutional requirement for state 
action. The First Amendment constrains governmental regulation of speech, 
and so requires state action; but if patents are a form of private property, the 
assertion of a patent seems to be private action rather than state action. The 
argument may be raised in a more direct form by simply asserting that the 
First Amendment cannot constrain patent owners because they are private 
actors, not governmental actors. 163 
While the general premise of this argument is quite correct, the 
application of the premise oversimplifies and misunderstands the nature of 
the state action doctrine. Vindication of private rights can constitute state 
action for First Amendment purposes. For example, plaintiffs vested with a 
defamation claim are not transformed into state actors, but the act of creating 
the claim and allowing its enforcement via the court system has been held 
by the Supreme Court to constitute state action.164 This is true not only for 
defamation, but for liability claims in a wide range of dignitary harms.165 
Granting a broadcaster a license to the exclusive use of a given frequency 
within a geographic area does not transform the broadcaster into a state 
actor, but the regulatory system that allocates, regulates, and enforces the 
broadcaster’s privilege is undoubtedly state action.166  
                                                 
162. See Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 107 (2014) (noting that the patent system is a form of market competition regulation); Mark 
A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 109 (2013) (same).  
163. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 6, at 597–99 (arguing that the patent enforcement lies outside 
the ambit of state action). 
164. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964); see also Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 
1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory private covenants constituted state 
action). Shelly represents the high water mark of recognition for state action, and while it remains good 
law, it certainly cannot be read to transform every private claim asserted through the courts to constitute 
state action. 
165. See David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 
765 (2004).  
166. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). 
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By the same token, vesting a patentee with exclusive rights in a given 
invention does not change the patent holder into a state actor; but the system 
that vets and certifies patent claims, allowing them to be enforced via the 
coercive mechanisms of the state, is undoubtedly state action.167 As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “The test is not the form in which state power 
has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact 
been exercised.”168 The constitutional question inheres not from the 
licensing or the enforcement of the patent by the owner once the patent is 
granted, but rather from the governmental grant of the patent and its promise 
of state coercion in the first place.169 
Additionally, when considering the scope and effects of such state 
sponsored exclusivity, it seems clear that patent assertion partakes more of 
the nature of state regulatory action than it does of private personal action. 
Certainly we give property owners engaged in private action latitude to 
suppress speech in ways that would be unacceptable for state actors. I may 
ask that you remain silent, or refrain from utterances I consider 
blasphemous, in my house of worship. I may ask that you not discuss 
politics or that you refrain from using invectives in my home. I may restrict 
your cell phone usage in my theater, requiring you to turn it off and not call 
or text during the performance. I may require you to agree to such speech 
restrictions as a condition of entering onto the property, and I may revoke 
your invitation and eject you if you violate my private rules. But the type of 
private speech restrictions listed above exercise censorship that is limited to 
a certain time and a certain physical area. There are typically other times 
and other places, not under the control of my particular private censorship, 
where your restricted viewpoint can be expressed.  
Thus, a key distinction between action on private property and state 
legislation or regulation is the scope of the effects. If private censorship 
were more widespread, it might be considered a greater threat to 
discourse—this was the case, for example, in the unusual Marsh v. Alabama 
decision, in which a private actor’s oversight of a geographic areas was so 
                                                 
167. Contra Chiang, supra note 8, at __ (arguing that issue of a patent by the Patent Office, and 
not private enforcement, satisfies the state action requirement). 
168. 376 U.S. at 265. 
169. Professor Thomas points out that in S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522 (1987), 
a trademark case, the Supreme Court declined to decide a Fifth Amendment claim on the grounds that 
the trademark holder was not a state actor for Fifth Amendment purposes; he infers from this that patent 
holders are unlikely to be state actors for First Amendment purposes. See Thomas, supra note 6, at 598. 
But this inference cannot be correct; in the same case, immediately prior to its Fifth Amendment 
discussion, the Court discussed the First Amendment implications of Congressional action to grant the 
trademark, and the trademark owners’ decision to enforce the mark, in terms that unquestionably entail 
state action. 483 U.S. at 532–41. 
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extensive as to have effectively adopted governmental status.170 State action 
typically looks very different than such limited private action, potentially 
engaging in regulation or exclusion that extends to all times and all places 
within the territory of the sovereign, and perhaps even to the speech of 
nationals when they are outside the territory of the sovereign.171 Indeed, 
state restriction of speech on public properties is subjected to scrutiny that 
considers the purpose and degree of the restriction.172 
Patent rights, even though they are privately exercised, entail these 
capacious features of state regulatory action rather than the restricted 
character of private action. I have already observed that physical and 
intellectual property differ in their regulation of individual expressive 
objects or actions on the one hand, as opposed to classes of objects or 
actions on the other.173 This difference is germane to the exercise of patent 
rights as private action. Rather than the usual limited scope of typical private 
action involving property, patents allow the rights holder to prohibit any use 
of the claimed invention within the territory of the sovereign during the 
validity of the patent—usually around twenty years. Thus, patents that cover 
a form of speech or communication, do not restrict access to a given object 
or bounded area, but prohibit anyone anywhere in the United States, its 
territories, or possessions from engaging in the claimed method of speech 
or communication.  
Consequently, the danger to expression from such expansive state-
sponsored rights parallels that from direct state regulation. Not 
coincidentally, the private tort rights such as defamation, which the 
Supreme Court has found to be limited by the First Amendment, have 
similar scope, extending expansively to any “publication” or 
communication of the libel, with virtually no geographic bounds. The 
expansive effect of a patent suit—which is also the enforcement of a tort 
claim174—similarly favors First Amendment restriction of its state coercive 
exercise. 
Indeed, even when considering the degree of state involvement, patents 
appear to be far more creatures of state action than the majority of private 
                                                 
170. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (applying First Amendment principles to privately 
owned municipality). 
171. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2016) (giving Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
extraterritorial effect). U.S. trademark law also has extraterritorial effects that implicate advertising and 
commercial speech outside the United States. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); 
Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F. 3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016).  
172. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790–91(1989). 
173. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
174. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Patent 
infringement is a tort.”). But see Sichelman, supra note 142 (questioning the classification of patent 
infringement as a tort). 
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entitlements. Very few private entitlements are reviewed and approved by 
the state in the way patents are. Certainly, patents might be viewed as 
constituting state action in a way that their constitutional cousins, 
copyrights, are not: a copyright simply attaches to whatever eligible original 
work an author produces. Although the copyrighted work may be registered 
with a federal agency, there is no detailed governmental examination or 
negotiation of the rights that accrue in the work. Patents, however, issue 
from a federal agency after administrative review and approval by 
governmental officials; the language defining the patent rights is negotiated 
with, and crafted in collaboration with representatives of the state. The 
scope of a given patent therefore entails a high degree of participation and 
approval by governmental agents.175 The state is involved at every stage of 
the patent’s lifecycle: legislating, reviewing, approving, issuing, and 
enforcing the patent warrant.176 
A variation on the state action theme rests upon the private decision to 
engage state coercion. Some have argued that patenting lacks the required 
First Amendment element of state action because enforcement of the 
exclusive rights conveyed by a patent is discretionary by means of a private 
suit.177 This argument seems altogether specious. There is no question that 
other governmentally granted rights—such as the right to compensation for 
defamation—that inhibit speech are analyzed as matters of First 
Amendment concern.178 Private rights of action for entitlements such as 
redress for defamation are also discretionarily effectuated by privately 
initiated court actions. But the Supreme Court has long held that invocation 
of the coercive power of the state, through the court system, in order to 
vindicate private burdens on expression constitutes the required state action 
for First Amendment purposes.179 
Neither does the discretionary initiation of infringement proceedings 
constitute a distinction that would relieve the patent system of First 
Amendment review.180 Some commentators on the related question 
regarding conflicts of copyright and expressive freedom have attempted to 
distinguish exclusive rights under the Intellectual Property Clause from 
other regulations by means of the argument that infringement may or may 
not be initiated by the rights holder. But of course, this is true of any 
                                                 
175. See Thomas, supra note 6, at 595.  
176. Id. 
177. Borelli & Lyons, supra note 15.  
178. Thus, while Professor Thomas notes that the courts typically do not view the recipients of 
governmental licenses and permits as state actors, such licenses, unlike patents, constitute state 
permission to engage in an activity—not a governmental warrant for private suits against others for 
engaging an activity. See Thomas, supra note 6, at 597–98.  
179. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
180. See Borelli & Lyons, supra note 15. 
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regulation of expression; prosecutors enforcing obscenity laws, or agencies 
enforcing broadcast regulations have discretion as to when and whether 
such rules will be enforced. The fact that an individual authorized to bring 
the claim may or may not choose to initiate enforcement does not alter the 
impact on protected speech, nor the chilling effect that accompanies 
potential sanctions, and most certainly does not excuse such actions from 
First Amendment review. 
D. Speech and Public Goods 
Despite the tendency to compare patent exclusivity to exclusive rights in 
land or other tangible property, the problem of patent exclusivity over 
expression may have its closest existing parallel in the First Amendment 
jurisprudence concerning broadcast spectrum.181 The Supreme Court has 
decided a long series of such cases, lying at the intersection of 
governmentally distributed exclusive rights, privately allocated 
entitlements, and the public interest in expressive freedom.182 The concerns 
animating these decisions are instructive for patent analysis, as broadcast 
spectrum allocation, like patenting, also entails a system of privately 
allocated exclusive rights intended to solve a public goods problem.183 
As mentioned previously, the most common jurisprudential justification 
for the patent system is that it fulfills its constitutional mandate to promote 
the progress of the useful arts by assigning exclusive rights in inventions 
that might otherwise be undersupplied because they display the qualities of 
public goods.184 Because technical knowledge is non-rivalrous and non-
exclusive once it has been developed, there is little incentive to develop it 
in the first instance; others who have been spared the investment costs can 
costlessly appropriate the invention and deprive the inventor of a return on 
the initial investment. Patent rights are expected to allow the inventor to 
                                                 
181. Cf. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (arguing that media law decisions 
indicate First Amendment constraints on intellectual property). 
182. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Sarah Oh, & Drew Clark, The Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 60–65 (2010) (tracing the history of the Supreme Court broadcast 
decisions). 
183. See John Berresford & Wayne Leighton, The Law of Property and the Law of Spectrum: A 
Critical Comparison, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 35 (2004) (examining the parallels between 
allocation of real property and allocation of spectrum); William W. Van Alstyne, The Möbius Strip of 
the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV. 539, 561–62 (1978) (comparing 
allocation of spectrum exclusivity to encumbered real property entitlements). 
184. See Burk, supra note 1, at 400–01. 
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legally exclude unauthorized uses, allowing a return on investment, which 
motivates investments in innovation.185 
Broadcast spectrum shares with patentable inventions some 
characteristics of a true public good but also displays some characteristics 
of a “common pool” good.186 Broadcast spectrum is non-rivalrous as to 
receivers, and non-exclusive as to both transmission and reception. 
Transmission can be congested, and consequently Congress, by means of 
delegation to a federal agency, allocates the frequencies of electromagnetic 
spectrum that can be used by particular broadcasters.187 These exclusive 
allocations are procured by means of lease or auction.188 Such allocations 
are clearly a regulation of the means of communicative expression or 
speech, and typically carry with them obligations that directly burden the 
form and content of speech carried over the airwaves. Broadcasters have at 
various times been prohibited, for example, from transmitting certain types 
of salacious but protected speech at certain times of the day or night.189 
Historically, spectrum allocation sometimes has carried with it obligations 
to use the allocation in the public interest, and even to accommodate equal 
access to types of political speech.190  
All of this regulation of expressive content and its conveyance has been 
viewed by the Supreme Court as consistent with the restrictions of the First 
Amendment, so long as the regulation remains within certain bounds.191 In 
particular, content regulation of broadcast has been allowed by the Supreme 
Court under a type of public goods rationale. Under the Red Lion line of 
cases, the Court has reasoned that broadcast spectrum is a common 
resource, the use of which may be allocated and regulated by Congress.192 
                                                 
185. Id. An alternative, less often asserted justification for patenting is the famous “prospect 
theory” articulated by Edmund Kitch. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). Prospect theory argues that patenting employs the allocation of 
private entitlements to curtail costly, rent-dissipating races to develop new technologies. See John F. 
Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004). While I do not explore 
prospect theory here, it may offer an even stronger parallel between patenting and spectrum allocation.  
186. See Gary D. Libecap, State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool Resources in 
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 754 (C. Menard & M.M. Shirley eds. 2005). 
187. Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, and 
the Commons, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 193 (L.F. Cranor & S.S. Wildman eds., 2003) (tracing the history of 
federal broadcast spectrum regulation). 
188. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)–(j) (2018). 
189. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 
U.S. 502 (2009) (discussing FCC authority to regulate broadcast indecency). 
190. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally R. Randall Rainey, The 
Public’s Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: 
A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269 (1993). 
191. See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based Promotion 
of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 237 (2009). 
192. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 389–90. 
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Congressional authority to manage the spectrum resource has been 
considered to include the provision of substantive requirements that the 
messages conveyed via the resource are consistent with the public 
interest.193 
The Court’s reasoning in Red Lion has long been contrasted with the 
contemporary decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 194 
where the Court declared a legal requirement for newspapers to provide 
opportunities for political reply to be an unconstitutional regulation as 
applied to newspapers.195 Having held in Red Lion that a similar requirement 
for broadcast was constitutionally permissible, these decisions appear 
somewhat contradictory in both outcome and rationale. The ostensible 
distinction according to the Court was the scarcity of broadcast spectrum: 
that the government had an obligation to allocate the scarce spectrum 
resource in the public interest. But subsequent commentators have pointed 
out the logical disconnection between regulation of a scarce resource and 
regulation of content: if newsprint had become scarce and required 
government rationing, application of the logic of Red Lion to regulate 
newspaper content seemed implausible.196  
A more plausible reading of the case concerns not so much scarcity in 
the sense of rarity or absence, but rather scarcity in the sense of resources 
constituting a quasi-public good.197 Absent licensing, anyone with the 
necessary equipment could access broadcast frequencies, potentially 
leading to too much broadcast and interference with other signals. FCC 
licensing, rather than addressing spectrum absence, in fact created an 
artificial scarcity of access in order to ameliorate the rivalrous but non-
exclusive consumption that might occur in the absence of licensing.198 
While newsprint rationing might interfere with some speakers by denying 
them the means to publish, it would not create simultaneous interfering 
speech, as might occur with simultaneous broadcasts over the same 
frequency.199 
The governmental allocation solution to the potential for medium 
congestion in turn imposes the burden of exclusivity on expressive freedom. 
                                                 
193. Id. 
194. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
195. See, e.g., Stuart M. Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment 
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 1–111 (2002); Hazlett et al., supra note 182, at 67; Van Alstyne, supra note 
183, at 544–45. 
196. Henry Geller, Turner Broadcasting, the First Amendment, and the New Electronic Delivery 
Systems, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
197. See C. Edwin Baker, Three Cheers for Red Lion, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 861, 866–67 (2008). 
198. Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J 1359, 1412–13 (2005). 
199. See FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 282 (1933) (stating that 
Congress may allow or deny broadcast licenses to prevent interference). 
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While Red Lion is known primarily for its holding that broadcast privileges 
may be permissibly encumbered with content regulation, this outcome is 
based on a manifest strain of concern over exclusivity.200 According to the 
Court, “[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited 
market-place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to 
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
Government itself or a private licensee.”201 Similarly, the opinion focuses 
on the communicative interests of the public, rather than those of spectrum 
rights holders: “It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of 
the broadcasters, which is paramount.”202 
Significantly, this concern over exclusivity continues into the later cable 
transmission cases, where the lack of alternative carriers within a 
geographic cable franchise area confers medium exclusivity, if not scarcity, 
on cable carriers.203 Much as broadcast allocations have sometimes entailed 
certain content obligations, so cable television transmissions have as a 
condition of their licensing been similarly subjected to requirements that 
they carry certain content on some of their channels.204 Although cable 
operators do not function under the same type of spectrum interference 
“scarcity” as broadcasters, the potential for transmission monopoly in the 
areas served by a cable system may justify narrowly tailored state 
intervention into the operation of the system.205 In other words, even though 
cable operators may own the physical media of transmission, their freedom 
to use it as they see fit may be circumscribed by the public interest.206 These 
cases thus attempt to strike within different technical contexts a balance 
among the First Amendment rights of the content receiving public, the First 
Amendment editorial rights of the designated transmission fiduciaries, and 
the governmental interest in orderly coordination of the means of 
transmission.207 
The analysis in such cases indicates the proper allocation of First 
Amendment interests that are salient to dealing with expressive patents. 
Each situation entails the grant of exclusive rights in a non-exclusive 
                                                 
200. See Baker, supra note 197, at 862–63. 
201. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). 
202. Id. at 390. 
203. Cf. Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part I: Why Can’t Cable Be More Like 
Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 245–47 (1987). 
204. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
205. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997). 
206. Cf. Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2343, 2365–67 
(2014) (explaining the historical public interest in regulation of cable broadband carriers). Essentially 
these same considerations have led to the more recent conflict over “net neutrality” by cable carriers. 
See generally DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE 
INTERNET AGE (2009). 
207. Michael J. Burstein, Note, Towards a New Standard for First Amendment Review of 
Structural Media Regulation, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030 (2004). 
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resource. Like the recipients of spectrum allocation exclusivity, patent 
holders hold a temporary monopoly in a public resource, as part of a 
Congressional system designed to manage and enhance that resource for the 
public’s benefit.208 And while patent holders are unlikely to be viewed as 
holding the First Amendment interests accorded to publishers, they 
nonetheless have interests, parallel to those of cable operators, in controlling 
and recouping their investment in the claimed invention. Governmentally 
granted exclusivity attempts to harness private incentives for public value, 
either in promoting innovation or managing telecommunications 
infrastructure. 
At the same time, the telecommunications cases demonstrate that such a 
grant of exclusivity does not place the owner of a broadcast or cable 
franchise beyond an obligation to accommodate freedom of expression. 
Neither should we expect the holder of congressionally granted patent 
entitlement to escape the demands of the First Amendment. Far from 
excusing rights holders from constitutional scrutiny of their trust, the 
broadcast cases suggest that such exclusivity invites First Amendment 
review where the privately exercised warrant impedes access to another 
public good, that of free expression.209 The exercise of exclusive but 
publicly granted rights, in inventions or in spectrum, may be legitimately 
limited by the public’s right to speak and to be heard. 
And while changes in the national political atmosphere have 
unquestionably relegated explicitly imposed public interest considerations 
to the background of media regulation,210 the Supreme Court’s broadcast 
jurisprudence similarly demonstrates that such interests are not 
incompatible with guarantees of expressive freedom. If cable and broadcast 
franchise holders can be required to carry certain content, or to limit certain 
programming, then the holders of patent franchises might be explicitly 
limited or encumbered in order to similarly effectuate expressive 
interests.211 Governmental grants of exclusivity are neither reserved from 
public interest scrutiny nor immune from governmental encumbrance. It 
follows that First Amendment considerations may be properly included 
when reviewing the exercise of patent or spectrum entitlements. 
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III. THE PROPER LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
Because neither its traditional contours, nor the state action requirement, 
nor their status as property excuse patents from First Amendment 
consideration, we at last confront the question as to how they fare against 
the standards applied to other regulation. In doing so we move into 
judicially uncharted territory, not in the sense that the elements of the 
relevant First Amendment analysis are vague or unknown—they are to the 
contrary well known and readily identifiable. Rather, the application of 
those familiar doctrines is unexplored not only with regard to the patent 
system, but also with regard to copyright, its parallel cognate system under 
the Intellectual Property Clause. Because the Supreme Court has always 
excused copyright from First Amendment scrutiny, it has never reached the 
familiar questions of content discrimination, substantial or compelling 
governmental interest, least restrictive means, and the like in the copyright 
context. 
Instead our guidance comes from general constitutional principles, as 
applied to the peculiarities of the patent system. I have, for example, argued 
above that the designation of a regulation as a “property right” does not of 
itself free the regulation from First Amendment scrutiny.212 The impulse to 
claim that it does perhaps comes from the sense that property rights are often 
acceptable under, if not entirely disengaged from, First Amendment 
scrutiny. Thus, a content neutral trespass statute that serves legitimate 
interests may be entirely permissible under the First Amendment.213 But we 
cannot know if the patent statute is content neutral or serves legitimate 
governmental interests by analogy; we must examine the statute itself. 
In addition, the same examination may need to be applied to individual 
patents, a peculiarity that serves to further separate patents from whatever 
previous First Amendment analysis may have been applied to other forms 
of intellectual property.214 Unlike other forms of intellectual property, patent 
rights are based entirely upon a governmentally issued text.215 When 
considering copyright, we begin with the creative work covered by the 
copyright; when considering trademark rights, we begin with the particular 
emblem that has become imbued with recognizable meaning. But when 
considering patent rights, we look to a document describing the invention 
rather than to any instantiation of the invention itself—indeed, at no time 
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during the life of the patent is the inventor required to produce the actual 
claimed invention.216 Patent rights are entirely reliant upon a defining text. 
This textual structure creates two possible levels of First Amendment 
challenge: to an individual patent itself, or to the patent statute from which 
it originates. This is not an unusual phenomenon in First Amendment 
jurisprudence; an injunction that restrains expressive conduct may be 
constitutionally infirm, or the statute on which the injunction is based may 
be constitutionally infirm, or both. But it will be necessary to consider 
whether the elements of a First Amendment claim may at times lead to 
different outcomes depending upon the level at which a challenge is 
brought. 
We will ask first then, as with any regulation, whether the patent statue 
is content neutral or content discriminatory. We may ask the same of a given 
patent. If the challenged regulation falls into the content neutral category, 
we apply intermediate scrutiny.217 If it falls into the discriminatory category, 
it receives a sufficiently heightened degree of scrutiny that passing 
constitutional muster becomes unlikely. Additionally, First Amendment 
scrutiny may change depending on whether the challenge to a regulation is 
facial or applied; in the former case, the regulation must be substantially 
overbroad in order to fail constitutional muster.218 Thus, our conclusions 
may change depending on whether the patent statute itself or its textual 
progeny become the analytical focus. 
A. Content Neutrality 
We begin by assessing whether the patent statute is content neutral or 
content discriminatory, as that designation will shunt further analysis 
toward either heightened or intermediate scrutiny. It should be immediately 
clear that the patent system as a whole is unquestionably content 
discriminatory, as are the individual patents that may burden speech. 
Content discrimination is inherent in the patent system; Congress intended 
to reward and to promote certain types of inventions. Inventions that 
encompass speech will be promoted and rewarded via state action if they 
meet the patentability criteria set out by Congress. Such content 
discrimination will vary along the spectrum that I have identified above; it 
will likely be least pronounced, and least problematic at the end of the 
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spectrum involving conduits of speech. It will likely be most pronounced, 
and most problematic at the end of the spectrum encompassing direct 
expression. 
Thus, looking to the center of the range for an example, we consider the 
case of computer code, which we have observed is judicially recognized as 
a form of protected speech.219 To pass muster under the patent system, such 
code must be novel and non-obvious, have patentable utility, and be 
susceptible to a written enabling description.220 Congress has provided that 
only production of code with these features is to be encouraged and 
rewarded by means of exclusive rights. Conversely, when it is rewarded by 
means of exclusive rights, use of that speech by others besides the patent 
holder is restricted. Code that is already known in the art, or which would 
be obvious to one of ordinary skill, or which lacks a serious and practical 
application, or which is not susceptible to written description, is excluded 
from the patent system. Additionally, the Alice test now provides that claims 
to computer code that lack a sufficiently “inventive concept” will also be 
excluded.221  
At the level of the individually issued patent, an additional measure of 
content discrimination is also sometimes manifest—individual patents will 
tend to regulate a specific manner or method of communication specified in 
their claims, and not other manners or methods of communication. 
For example, the 2002 patent on a method for drafting patents, 
mentioned above, is directed to a specific type of expression: patents.222 The 
2007 patent on Internet advertising, mentioned above, similarly applies to a 
particular category of speech—advertising—and not to novels or 
interpretive dance or sculpture. 
There may be some inclination to say that patents, or the patent statute, 
should not trigger strict scrutiny standard because patents are issued on the 
basis of technical criteria rather than on the basis of particular message or 
perspective, and so cannot be impermissibly directed to deterring or 
promoting particular content. But this instinctive supposition fails to 
distinguish between content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality.223 The First 
Amendment restricts not only regulatory discrimination as to categories of 
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speech, but also discrimination as to favored or disfavored messages within 
the category. 224 Thus, the government may restrict fighting words, which 
are an unprotected category of speech, but it may not distinguish among 
viewpoints in doing so; it may restrict all fighting words, or none, but may 
not select favored or disfavored fighting words.225 Viewpoint discrimination 
is almost never permissible because of the exclusion of particular messages 
from public discourse.226 But content or subject matter restrictions, even if 
viewpoint neutral, will still trigger strict scrutiny.227 
Patent law does not appear to discriminate as to viewpoints. The patent 
statute discriminates as to the types of technology subject to patents, but 
entails no explicit restrictions on messages carried by, or entailed in the 
technology. Software patents issue only to software that is judged new and 
non-obvious, but the substance of information conveyed to other 
programmers by the code is not a patentability criterion; the patent statute 
does not seem to encourage or reward particular styles or schools of thought 
within computer programming. Similarly, claims directed to methods of 
advertising or communicating do not typically specify a certain message. 
But granted patents allow exclusion of a subset of speech or methods of 
speaking that are novel, useful, and non-obvious. These patentability criteria 
of course apply to all types of patents, whether they involve exclusivity that 
burdens speech or not, but the result is that only a subset of speech is eligible 
for the benefits or burdens of patenting.  
This point is perhaps best illustrated in a parallel context: imagine a 
governmental regulation that requires licenses for the dissemination of 
novel scientific publications. Novelty might be judged in terms of time, say, 
by requiring a license for any new publication after January 1, 2018. Or it 
might be judged qualitatively, say, by requiring a license for any publication 
that generates a high citation count, or that garners a Nobel or other 
scientific prize. Such a licensing restriction would be viewpoint neutral in 
the sense that it did not discriminate as to the individual message conveyed 
by any paper restricted under the system. But it would certainly not be 
content neutral, as it would be directed to particular categories of protected 
speech; it clearly triggers First Amendment concerns, and would likely 
garner an extremely stringent level of judicial scrutiny. 
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A variation on the argument regarding content neutrality might be to say 
that patentability criteria are not likely to mask invidious censorship. One 
important purpose identified by the Supreme Court as a justification for 
stringent constitutional jurisprudence on content neutrality has been the 
concern that such discrimination could eliminate subjects or categories of 
speech from the marketplace of ideas, and so distort public discussion.228 
There is of course little evidence that content discrimination in the patent 
system is intended to suppress public discourse; patentability restrictions 
seem clearly intended to offer the reward of exclusivity only to the most 
meritorious technical advances. It seems therefore unlikely that 
discrimination in patentable subject matter is legislative cover for invidious 
censorship, but rather exists for a legitimate purpose, a consideration which 
factors into the First Amendment analysis, and to which we will return.  
But although this is a factor to be considered in review of content based 
regulation; it does not change the test that we apply. The Supreme Court has 
made clear that laws discriminating with regard to content are treated to 
strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s purpose in regulating.229 In 
the case of patent regulation, notwithstanding the lack of intent to censor, 
patent law’s content discrimination may well have the effect of distortion in 
the marketplace of ideas. Indeed, novel and non-obvious forms of speech 
are very likely to be among the most persuasive or effective forms of speech; 
as I have observed above, it is small comfort to say that handwritten 
manuscripts can still be produced despite the exclusive rights granted by the 
government on the printing press.230 Patents are not available for the older 
forms of advertising, via television or billboards, that lack novelty because 
they are well-known in the art; so these may still be used by speakers even 
if the patentee of Internet advertising is unwilling to offer a license. But 
patent law discriminates among these forms of expression, offering 
exclusivity for the latter but not for the former. 
It also bears emphasizing that the criteria for patentability become 
problematic only to the extent that they select among forms of speech rather 
than among forms of technology. Requirements for novelty or utility only 
mature into content discrimination where protected expression is at issue. 
The majority of patent claims likely fall outside expressive subject matter, 
and do not implicate speech or guarantees of free expression. When the 
statutory criteria for novelty, obviousness, utility and the like are applied to 
non-expressive subject matter, let us say to a new kind of windshield wiper 
or to a novel polymer plastic molecule, they select for functional criteria 
rather than for expressive content. For such non-expressive patents, the 
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statutory patenting criteria are by definition content neutral, because there 
is no expressive content against which to discriminate. 
This distinction again highlights the problematic nature of software 
patenting. We have already noted that software is sometimes expressive and 
sometimes functional, and so has in the past been linked to the O’Brien 
intermediate level of scrutiny for content-neutral regulation.231 Application 
of the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny standard considers whether the 
regulation is directed to conduct, and only incidentally burdens speech 
related to the conduct, or whether the regulation is directed to the conduct 
itself.232 In the export control cases, although software was recognized as 
expressive in some forms, governmental control of its functional, technical 
aspects in order to maintain public order was weighted heavily in the 
analysis.233 Software as executed within a machine was deemed a form of 
expressive conduct or function, making the burden on expression incidental 
to the regulation of function, making intermediate scrutiny appropriate.234 
On a very simplistic view of the patent grant, it might be tempting to 
conclude that patent exclusivity is directed to conduct, that is, to 
infringement of the patent, and only incidentally burdens speech. This 
argument is quickly reduced to an absurdity, as one might just as well argue 
that any regulation of speech is directed to conduct, such as moving one’s 
lips or typing on a keyboard, and only “incidentally burdens” the resulting 
speech. The proper distinction seems rather to be that some types of conduct 
are themselves speech, and so receive very stringent First Amendment 
scrutiny, and some other kinds of conduct, while expressive, are materially 
engaged in a fashion that invites the imposition of public order. Public 
picketing235 and setting fires236 are expressive, but also physically 
disorderly, and the state’s legitimate interest in maintaining physical order 
weighs heavily in the balance. The state has far less interest in ordering lip 
movement, typing, or other conduct that constitutes speech. 
Such an analysis of software points to differing standards for patents 
situated along the range of patents discussed above. On this logic, if looking 
at the level of the individual patent, intermediate scrutiny seems most likely 
to apply to the “conduit” patents we have identified, such as printing presses 
or telecommunications protocols. When issuing patents to inventions such 
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as printing presses, the discriminatory criteria of the patent statute are most 
likely to be separating novel, non-obvious, and useful functional devices 
from among the available technologies. There may be incidental burdens on 
expression, but the functionality is the primary target of the exclusivity 
incentive. In contrast, strict scrutiny seems most likely to apply to the more 
purely expressive patents covering methods of advertising writing or 
instruction; functionality or “conduct” is in those cases at a minimum and 
the burden of exclusivity falls directly on speech. 
And when considering the patent system as a whole, so long as patents 
issue on expressive subject matter, strict scrutiny will likely apply. This 
outcome becomes clearer when, again, we imagine something like the 
patentability criteria introduced into a more familiar content-neutral setting. 
The state may, for example, choose to limit or require advance scheduling 
of parades so as to manage the physical space available, avoid public 
altercations, and control noise and litter. This is classic content neutral 
regulation so long as the content or message of the parades is not a criterion 
for permission. Such regulation may even be viewed as speech promoting, 
as it prevents physical disruption and interference among competing events 
so that the messages at those can be conveyed. But so soon as the state bases 
permit criteria on the substantive merit of the events, on whether the parades 
are interesting, or inspiring, or novel, or inventive, or publicly useful—
content neutrality ends and strict scrutiny applies. The purpose for such 
governmental selection may be entirely laudable—to build community or to 
promote discussion—but assessment of governmental purposes is an 
element of strict scrutiny, not a waiver from it. The same is true of the 
content criteria for expressive patents. 
B. Governmental Interest 
Where a regulation is content discriminatory, in order to pass strict 
scrutiny, it must further a compelling governmental interest; where 
intermediate scrutiny is concerned, the governmental interest must be 
substantial. The role of this requirement is clearer if we return to an example 
raised by the first patent discussed above, regarding governmental 
regulation of equipment used in communication. Given the history of the 
First Amendment, and the history of licensing printing presses, we have said 
that there is little question that governmental ban or restriction of printing 
presses would run afoul of the First Amendment, and seems likely to trigger 
strict scrutiny that the regulation would be unlikely to pass. But content 
neutral regulation of such equipment for a substantial governmental purpose 
might be a different matter; if printing plants pose occupational hazards, 
then health and safety regulation to protect against, say, mechanical injury 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
  
 
 
 
 
2018] PATENTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 251 
 
 
 
 
or toxic exposures, would almost certainly pass constitutional muster. 
Similarly, within First Amendment considerations, tort liability may lie for 
the publication of defective or erroneous information.237 
One might thus imagine permissible governmental restrictions or 
outright prohibitions on types of printing equipment that were found to be 
especially dangerous or environmentally destructive, so long as sufficient 
alternative models of printing equipment were available. However, 
burdensome health and safety regulation of plants printing certain types of 
content, such as pornographic magazines, would be suspect and subjected 
to closer scrutiny. Placing the execution of prohibited regulation in the 
hands of private deputies would hardly avoid the constitutional infirmity, 
just as placing content discriminatory health and safety regulation of 
printers into the care of private actors would not avoid the constitutional 
question. 
Where patents are concerned, the requirement of a compelling 
governmental interest for issuing patents can almost certainly be satisfied. 
The patent system is generally justified as a means to encourage innovation, 
by providing inventors the reward of exclusivity for suitable technological 
contributions.238 This is almost by definition a compelling governmental 
interest; the conclusion that such purposes are substantial, and probably 
compelling, is reinforced by the constitutional authority entailed in article I, 
section 8, clause 8. Even if we move from the general to the specific, from 
promoting innovation in general, to promoting innovation in specific fields 
such as software, chemistry, or medical devices, the governmental interest 
in promoting social welfare seems compelling in order to improve the 
general welfare. 
Of course, even though promoting the progress of the useful arts is an 
interest validated by the language of the constitution itself, constitutional 
authority is not a panacea. All Congressional enactments must be grounded 
in some enumerated power, and the First Amendment exists to constrain 
those powers.239 Enactment of a viewpoint discriminatory speech regulation 
by means of the Patent Clause power does not, simply by virtue of the 
enactment’s constitutional basis, excuse the regulation from being 
unconstitutional any more than would enactment of a viewpoint 
discriminatory speech regulation by means of the Commerce Power. But 
the Intellectual Property clause offers something not offered by most of 
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Congress’s enumerated powers, which is an explicitly articulated purpose 
for permissible use of the power, which is to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts.240 This, again, does not excuse an unconstitutional 
exercise of the power in violation of the First Amendment, but it does offer 
textual guidance as to the proper use of the power, and in particular what 
purposes for a regulation ought to be considered compelling. 
C. Narrow Tailoring 
Narrow tailoring poses a trickier question: could we say that the patent 
statute, which is likely to authorize at least some patents that burden speech, 
and which furthers the compelling constitutional interest in promoting 
technical progress, has been narrowly tailored to avoid burdening the 
equally compelling constitutional interest in free expression? As I have 
suggested above (in parallel with Judge Mayer) certain patent doctrines, 
including subject matter exclusions, might not entirely exclude expressive 
subject matter, but could be applied so as to help restrict the intrusion of 
patents into protected speech.241 Some of these doctrines, such as 
experimental use, are currently somewhat atrophied, but could be re-
invigorated.242 In a similar vein, Kevin Collins points out that patent law 
includes screening doctrines that tend to orient patents toward functional 
subject matter, and away from expressive content.243 Such features of patent 
law might be pointed to as evidence of narrow tailoring. 
At the same time, the clear inadequacy of the same features might be 
cited as evidence that Congress has failed to narrowly tailor the Patent Act. 
We have already seen that, without using the terminology of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has essentially said that the 
Copyright Act is adequately tailored by adherence to its “traditional 
contours” of fair use and idea/expression separation.244 Thus, we might 
conclude that Congress knows how to narrowly tailor an intellectual 
property statute when it cares to, and has simply failed to do so in the case 
of patents. A number of commentators have suggested that, as in copyright, 
explicit exceptions should be incorporated into the patent statute; some type 
of patent analog to the fair use exception,245 as well as a robust experimental 
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use exception,246 would be high on the list for such additions. The lack of 
such exceptions for patents might be taken as a failure to narrowly tailor. 
In the same vein, even if Judge Mayer is correct that patent law’s existing 
doctrinal carve-outs are adequate to avoid a constitutional conflict, they are 
not for the most part found in the patent statute, and so cannot be attributed 
to legislative tailoring. Unlike copyright, where the statute explicitly 
incorporates exceptions to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, 
patent exceptions are for the most part judicial glosses that may come and 
go. Section 101 of the patent statute expresses no subject matter reservations 
regarding abstract ideas, laws of nature, or mental steps; doctrinal 
exclusions such as printed matter are not found in the statute either. These 
have instead been read into the statute by the courts. Such exclusions have 
at times declined or disappeared altogether.247 In the nearly forty years 
between the Supreme Court’s software subject matter decisions in 
Gottschalk v. Benson and Alice Corp v. CLS Bank, the strength and reach of 
the Section 101 exemptions has waxed and waned, at times due to contrary 
decisions from the lower courts, but clearly due to effective reversals by the 
Supreme Court itself. While courts may attempt to read statutes so as to 
avoid constitutional conflicts, these patent exemptions have been judicially 
manufactured out of whole cloth and cannot be attributed to Congress. 
A related issue may be the question as to whether the patent system, 
notwithstanding any textual tailoring of the statute, unnecessarily burdens 
speech by means of improperly issued patents, that is, patents that do not 
promote innovation, or that lie outside the properly applied statutory 
limitations of the statute, but which erroneously issue anyway. It is 
generally understood that the Patent Office has a significant error rate, 
where error is taken to mean issuing patents that are later invalidated, or that 
would be invalidated if subjected to closer review.248 To the extent that such 
patents burden speech, they may do so unnecessarily, as they were not 
necessarily directed to the type of inventions contemplated by Congress as 
meeting the threshold for patent exclusivity.  
Bad software patents appear to have been at least in part a motivator of 
Judge Mayer’s concerns, and the question of “bad patents” clogging the 
system and deterring innovation has been the topic of extensive 
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investigation.249 But the generation of improper patent grants creates two 
distinct problems for First Amendment purposes: it may be that the patent 
system is constitutionally defective, routinely allowing patents that 
improperly read on expressive content. Or, it may be that despite patent 
quality safeguards, in some cases that individual patents improperly read on 
expressive content, having slipped through the Patent Office because of 
occasional or inadvertent error. Either occurrence may present a tailoring 
defect, but the former will cause the system rather than a given patent to fail 
constitutional muster. 
D. Overbreadth 
The discussion of narrow tailoring leads us to the mechanism for 
challenging a given patent or challenging the patent statute; challenging the 
patent statute itself as contrary to the First Amendment may be a very 
different matter than challenging a given patent as contrary to the First 
Amendment. As I have suggested above, individual patents constrain 
speech according to the scope of their particular claims, and might 
impermissibly constrain speech even if the underlying patent statute is 
constitutionally sound in much the same way that a given parade permit or 
an injunction, issued pursuant to a certain regulatory scheme, might 
impermissibly violate the First Amendment, even if the underlying 
regulatory scheme is sound. Alternatively, the underlying regulatory 
scheme may be constitutionally impermissible, so that any permit, 
injunction, or patent issuing from it is likewise tainted.  
Constitutional jurisprudence provides for challenges both at the level of 
the regulatory scheme and at the level of specific instances of regulation, 
distinguishing between challenges that are facial and challenges as-applied. 
The former claims that a given statute is unconstitutional under all 
circumstances; the latter claims that the statute is unconstitutional in relation 
to a given plaintiff’s set of circumstances. Where the First Amendment is 
concerned, this has led to the development of an additional type of 
overbreadth facial challenge.250 Statutes are said to be overbroad when they 
may chill or deter speech not before the court; that is, when a plaintiff can 
point to concrete or plausible detrimental effects of the statute on others 
besides herself. Because of the difficulty of crafting a regulation that reaches 
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only unprotected speech, and does not burden any protected speech, the 
Supreme Court has required a showing of substantial overbreadth for facial 
successful challenges. It is not enough to show that some protected speech 
may be affected by a regulation; the facial challenger must show significant 
social costs imposed under the terms of regulation. 
A facial challenge is proper, for example, where a licensing scheme gives 
“unbridled discretion” to approve or disapprove of expressive activity, due 
to the potential for tacit approval or disapproval on the basis of favored or 
disfavored content.251 In one sense, patent grants are not unbridled: the grant 
of patents by the Patent Office is constrained by the substantive and 
procedural requirements to obtain a patent. But these constraints have little 
to do with the expressive content that may be entailed within patent claims; 
governmental discretion in that regard is essentially unconstrained outside 
the perfunctory subject matter limitations we have noted.252 And, we have 
seen that once granted, the patent constitutes a delegation of licensing 
discretion to private parties, backed by the coercive power of the state.253 
Discretion to license or not is effectively unbridled, as there is no oversight 
or procedural constraint on the decision of the patent owner to allow or 
disallow use of the claimed content so that where patents entail expression, 
a facial challenge might seem proper.  
It might be objected that in the typical First Amendment scenario where 
speech licensing is a concern, the license contemplates administrative 
permission to speak,254 whereas patenting in effect tenders a license against 
speaking; that is, the state confers exclusive rights that prohibit 
unauthorized speech encompassed by the claims of the patent.255 Speech by 
means of the invention is freely allowed if the patent is denied. But this is 
undoubtedly a distinction without a difference; governmental grants of the 
right to suppress speech are surely as problematic as government grants of 
the right to allow speech. While the defaults may be different, either form 
of the licensing power may be exercised or withheld in order to permit or 
suppress favored speech. In the case of classic expressive licensing schemes 
such as permits for parades or demonstrations, the default prior to grant of 
                                                 
251. Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992); Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publ. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988) 
252. See supra notes 86–106 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra notes 164–80 and accompanying text. 
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a parade or demonstration permit is silence; but the default after the grant 
of a patent is silence. 
Certainly, the rationale for the facial challenge remains the same in either 
case. The Supreme Court has in the past emphasized that one of the evils of 
a licensing system is the likelihood of self-censorship by speakers who fear 
denial of permission to speak.256 In the case of a patent, such self-censorship 
is still a concern, although one step removed: while the grant of a patent is 
not the grant of a license to speak, it is (for expressive patents) the 
governmental grant of a private entitlement to control speech. A license to 
speak is then required from the patent holder, on threat of enforcement via 
the coercive mechanisms of the state. Legitimate speakers who fear the 
expense related patent enforcement may choose to remain silent, or at a 
minimum to find safer and possibly less desirable means of expression. This 
may occur whether the enforcement is justified or unjustified; even if the 
patent is invalid or uninfringed, defending a suit is costly. Alternatively, 
avoiding potential liability by means of a license burdens the speaker, 
deterring some speech for which the cost of the patent license and its 
attendant transactions are deterrent or prohibitive. 
E. Vagueness 
The question of patent overbreadth also implicates the closely related 
constitutional doctrine of vagueness.257 Stemming from due process 
considerations, the doctrine requires statutes to be sufficiently definite so 
that persons of ordinary intelligence can ascertain the meaning of the 
statute.258 Although this requirement is most frequently associated with 
criminal statutes, the Supreme Court has made clear that civil statutes and 
regulations must similarly give “fair notice” of the permissible range of 
behavior.259 From a First Amendment standpoint, vague statutes are most 
likely to be overbroad, spilling over from regulation of unprotected speech 
to regulation of adjacent protected speech. Vague statutes are likely to exert 
a “chilling effect” on protected speech because of the necessity of guessing 
at the statute’s requirements.260 And vague statutes are most likely to 
provide opportunities for governmental overreaching, providing 
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standard for imposing civil fines unconstitutionally vague). 
260. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 
1048–51(1991); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/1
  
 
 
 
 
2018] PATENTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 257 
 
 
 
 
opportunities for suppression of disfavored speech by means of the 
indefinite statutory language.261 
At the same time, patent law has its own set of vagueness doctrines, 
related to the definiteness of claims under section 112 of the patent statute. 
Section 112 requires claims that distinctly point out and particularly claim 
the rights related to the invention.262 Such claims must communicate with 
“reasonable certainty” the boundaries of the patent holder’s rights.263 As in 
constitutional vagueness, claim definiteness is meant to put the public on 
notice as to what conduct is proscribed, that is, what technology is off limits 
by means of the patent.264 Claim definiteness is also intended to keep the 
patent holder honest, deterring overreaching beyond the limits of the patent 
grant under cover of vague language.  
So at first blush, it might seem that patent law’s requirements for claim 
definiteness might ameliorate problems of First Amendment vagueness, and 
possibly overbreadth, with regard to individually issued patents. Individual 
patents that failed to meet the requirements of claim definiteness might be 
unconstitutionally vague, but would be invalid in any case. Staying within 
the requirement of section 112 claim definiteness might shield individual 
patents from vagueness problems, and the vagueness or overbreadth of the 
patent statute itself would be no different than that of any legislative 
enactment. 
But in fact patent law’s requirements are mismatched to the 
constitutional concern, and may in fact exacerbate them.265 The claims of a 
patent are not written to be understood by ordinary speakers; patent claims 
are instead expected to be comprehensible to the “person having ordinary 
skill in the art,” or “PHOSITA,” a sort of fictional embodiment of the 
knowledge and skill attributable to the relevant technical community.266 In 
fact, patent claims are likely to be incomprehensible to technicians, and 
understood only by patent law specialists.267 But in any event they are 
certainly not comprehensible to the lay reader, nor are they intended to be. 
Neither does the law require lay comprehension.268 As a consequence, the 
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OFF. SOC’Y 37, 54 (1991) (describing the §112 characteristics of the person having ordinary skill in the 
art). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
258 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:197 
 
 
 
lay speaker, preparing to engage in constitutionally protected expression, is 
unlikely to glean from the patent any notice as to whether her actions may 
be subject to infringement penalties. 
This potential for a vagueness challenge is further enhanced by the 
statutory standard set for infringement liability. The Supreme Court’s 
vagueness doctrine indicates that an ameliorating factor that may disincline 
the courts to apply vagueness to a statute is the presence of a scienter 
requirement, which may tend to shield actors who do not know or 
understand the statutory consequences of their conduct from those very 
consequences.269 Significantly, private enforcement of rights that burden 
speech similarly require heightened mens rea.270 But this is not the case for 
patent liability.271 Patent infringement is generally viewed as a strict liability 
offense;272 the statute specifies no scienter requirement for direct 
infringement,273 and indeed innocent infringement seems to be the norm.274 
Thus the statute does not relieve unwitting speakers from running afoul 
incomprehensible patent text, and the statute’s strict liability scheme points 
toward vagueness, not away. 
F. Least Restrictive Means 
Finally, both intermediate and strict scrutiny are couched in terms of 
narrow tailoring, although this means something quite different in the 
respective levels of scrutiny—under intermediate scrutiny, narrow tailoring 
entails crafting the regulation so as to curtail no more speech than necessary 
to achieve the government’s legitimate ends.275 But under the more stringent 
narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, regulations are judged as to 
whether they constitute the least restrictive means of achieving the 
compelling governmental interest.276 If there are available alternative 
methods to fully achieve the same ends that would restrict only conduct 
rather than speech, or would limit rather than entirely prohibit speech,277 
then those means should have been employed. The narrow tailoring 
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standard also requires that the challenged regulation must advance the 
compelling interest;278 the Court’s decisions indicate that the state need not 
prove this relationship empirically, but may rely on common-sense 
judgement as to the connection between the two.279 Finally, the regulation 
must not be overinclusive, in the sense of restricting significant speech that 
lies outside the government’s compelling interest.280  
If one is truly serious regarding the requirement for “least” restrictive 
means, it seems quite possible that the patent system as presently constituted 
might fail. Even under intermediate scrutiny Congress “must demonstrate 
that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the [content] 
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”281 
Patents are intended to promote progress, and to do so through exclusivity, 
which imposes restrictions on speech. But there is little evidence to show 
that patents in fact further this goal,282 and in some industries it appears 
likely that patents actually impede innovation more than they promote it.283 
Additionally, recent scholarship has explored in some detail the 
alternative systems that might be used to promote innovation without 
resorting to restrictive exclusivity.284 Although details regarding the exact 
degree of efficacy and efficiency of these alternatives remain debated, it 
appears quite feasible that systems of prizes,285 or buyout systems,286 could 
be developed that would equally well promote innovation without 
necessarily granting exclusive rights. Other scholars have similarly 
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explored the range of legislative options, from tax credits to grants287 to 
regulatory penalties288 that can be and often are deployed in order to 
promote innovation, again without the grant of exclusivity. In short, there 
seems to be ample room for less restrictive, or even non-restrictive 
mechanisms to achieve the desired goal of innovation incentive.  
Alternatively, even if we were to decide either that offering exclusivity 
to promote innovation is the constitutionally preferred approach, or that 
Congress may decide that patent exclusivity seems likely to be at least as 
effective as prizes or tax credits, then we might still be left with the concern 
that the current patent system is not the least restrictive patent system 
available. There is no particular reason that the patent system must exist in 
exactly the form in which we now observe it. Here Judge Mayer’s critique 
has some traction; a less restrictive system might be achieved within the 
current system by adaptation and enforcement of existing doctrines. To the 
extent that current patent doctrines permit unnecessary exclusivity over 
expression, or to the extent that the statute lacks robust “fair use” 
exemptions that might accommodate expressive freedom, the patent system 
may be more restrictive than needed to promote innovation.  
Neither should we assume that, even were it structured so as to 
accommodate some expression, patenting is necessarily the least restrictive 
means to accomplish the promotion of progress in all fields. Congress has 
used other intellectual property systems to promote innovation in some 
fields, such as including software within copyright. Indeed, Congress has 
on occasion provided exclusive rights besides patents to promote certain 
types of investment in innovation.289 To the extent that an alternative system 
such as copyright incorporates the “traditional contours” doctrines that the 
Supreme Court believes safeguard freedom of expression, it may be that 
restricting subject matter such as software to copyright offers the less 
restrictive means that strict scrutiny requires.  
Of course, in the context of considering the relation of copyright to the 
First Amendment, the Supreme Court has held “that it is generally for 
Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright 
Clause’s objectives”290 and it may be that the Supreme Court would be 
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similarly reluctant to second-guess Congress as to the means permissible to 
promote patentable innovation. But least restrictive means evaluation 
almost requires courts to second-guess legislative determinations, and we 
have already distinguished copyright from patent in the lack of any of the 
Court’s “traditional contours” exceptions.291 It is moreover a little difficult 
to take this elision seriously on its face; the Constitution also commits to 
Congress decisions as to how best to pursue the objectives entailed in its 
other enumerated powers, but the Court has never hesitated to issue 
constitutional corrections when the Commerce or Tax or Bankruptcy 
powers have been misused, and certainly not when Congressional decisions 
exceed the limits imposed in the Bill of Rights. Once strict scrutiny is 
invoked it is the business of the courts to determine whether Congress’s 
decisions impose an impermissible burden on expressive rights. 
For that matter, to the extent that the Patent Office improperly issues 
patents that restrict expression, that could or should be barred by the Alice 
test, it may be the administration of the patent system that is overly 
restrictive, even if the underlying statute is thought to be designed as a least 
restrictive means. As suggested by the overbreadth discussion above, any 
given patent that is improperly issued is by definition overly restrictive. 
Once again, just as an unconstitutionally broad anti-demonstration 
injunction might be based upon a constitutionally acceptable time, place and 
manner statute, so an unconstitutional individual patent might be based 
upon a constitutionally acceptable patent statute. Whether or not Congress 
has satisfied the First Amendment by selecting the least speech restrictive 
means to promote innovation generally, it may be that courts need to 
examine individual patents to determine if they are the least restrictive grant 
of exclusivity to accomplish Congress’s goals for a particular innovation. 
Scrutiny at the level of the individual patent would require courts to 
assess whether any given patent is the “least restrictive” patent, or in other 
words, whether narrower claims could be drawn to offer an incentive 
without reading on protected speech. This might seem onerous or infeasible 
for generalist courts to assess such technical language, comparing it to 
technical alternatives, and essentially second-guessing the determination of 
the Patent Office. But courts already routinely do exactly this, parsing patent 
claims to determine whether they are overly broad for patent purposes, for 
example, to determine if they read on prior art that cannot be legitimately 
claimed as novel or non-obvious by the patent holder. As long as the judge 
is construing claims for patentability, it may be that she should 
simultaneously assess the claims in speech-oriented patents for overbroad 
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claims that read on expressive content or activity and that constitute an 
impermissible intrusion on protected speech. 
CONCLUSION 
As I said at the outset, my goals in the article are in some senses relatively 
modest. From the First Amendment perspective, I have proposed no new 
doctrines; I have advocated no change in existing doctrines. I have merely 
applied existing First Amendment jurisprudence in an unfamiliar setting. 
My analysis suggests that neither the patent system as a whole, nor entire 
categories of patents, such as software patents, necessarily constitute 
impermissible intrusions on free speech. I would fully expect many, and 
likely most patents, to pass First Amendment muster when subjected to the 
First Amendment scrutiny. Not all information technology patents implicate 
First Amendment concerns; not all patentable subject matter concerns 
involve the First Amendment; not all free speech concerns related to patents 
would be solved by solving the problems related to patentable subject matter 
or to improvidently issued software patents.  
But I have also shown that the patent system is by no means free of First 
Amendment entanglements. The analysis outlined here should make clear 
that the constitutional acceptability of many—or even most—patents does 
not excuse them from scrutiny when the right to expression is implicated. 
Neither will all patents stand up to careful First Amendment scrutiny. The 
implications of my analysis are therefore anything but modest: my analysis 
indicates that we have for decades tolerated—in fact, ignored—substantial 
burdens on the expressive constitutional rights of the public. And this means 
from the patent perspective that both the policy and the doctrinal 
implications are stark; my argument here charts at minimum a new course 
to challenge the validity of thousands of issued patents and may possibly 
challenge the current structure of the patent statute itself. 
Recognition of this truth in Judge Mayer’s Intellectual Ventures 
concurrence is perhaps analytically inelegant, and likely conflates several 
different concerns regarding patents in the information technology space; 
nonetheless, his general point is unquestionably correct. Patents now more 
than ever implicate and potentially impede the expressive guarantees of the 
First Amendment. Much of my purpose here has been to translate Judge 
Mayer’s insight into doctrinal analyses and to point out the areas of contact 
and potential conflict between patents and expressive freedom.  
I fully expect what I have said to be the beginning of a robust discussion, 
not the end. First Amendment doctrines are nuanced and complex; the 
jurisprudence and commentary on free speech is vast. I have only given the 
barest outline of how the patent system may fare when expressive concerns 
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are taken seriously. There unquestionably remains much still to be said 
about each of the doctrines I have mentioned here. And while legislative 
intervention may be desirable, the unfortunate reality of legislative 
dynamics means that realistically any hope for a solution must begin with 
the courts.292 The existing patent exceptions such as the printed matter 
doctrine, or Judge Mayer’s favored subject matter exceptions, are judicial 
creations not found in the patent statute. Such doctrines are the most readily 
adapted and available tools to avoid the inevitable clash between patents 
and the First Amendment. 
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